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ABSTRACT

Despite the rich literature on theories of stock splits, studies have omitted public
utility firms from their analysis and only analyzed split by industrial firms when
examining mana gerial motives for splitting their stock. I examine the liquiditymarketability hypothesis, which states that stock splits enhance the attractiveness of
shares to individual investors and increase trading volume by adjusting prices to an
optimum trading range. Changes in the regulatory process, resulting from EPACT, have
opened a window of opportunity for the study and comparison of the two traditional
motives for splitting stock --signaling versus liquidity- marketability motives. Public
electric utility firms provide a clean testing ground for these two non-mutually exclusive
theories as liquidity/marketability hypothesis should dominate before the enactment of
the EPACT since the conventional signaling theory of common stock splits should not
apply given the low levels of information asymmetry in regulated utility companies. In
the post-EPACT period, however, the signaling effect is expected to play a more
dominant role. Based on both univariate and multivariate analyses, my results are
consistent with the hypothesis posed. For the pre-EPACT period, liquidity motive seems
to predominate in explaining the abnormal announcement return of utility stock splits. On
the other hand, the results support the signaling motive as a leading explanation of
abnormal returns in the post-EPACT period.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

In a stock split a certain number of new shares are substituted for each outstanding share.
The only changes are par value and number of shares outstanding adjusted by the split factor.
All other capital accounts remain unchanged. However, previous research documents that
investors react positively to the announcements of stock splits suggesting that there are benefits
associated with splitting stocks. 1 Grinblatt, Masulis and Titman (1984), for example, report a
significant announcement period abnormal return of approximately 3 percent for splitting firms.
McNichols and Dravid (1990) conclude that stock splits reveal information about future dividend
and earning changes. In addition, Ikenberry, Rankine and Stice (1996) and Desai and Jain (1997)
find that splitting firms experience significant long-run excess returns as well.
Two major theories have emerged in the financial literature to explain the positive
abnormal returns at the announcements of stock splits; the signaling theory and the trading range
theory. The signaling theory posits that firms split their shares to reveal favorable future
information. Asquith, Healey, and Palepu (1989) argue that managers announce stock splits to
reveal future earning information. Brennan and Hughes (1991) and Schultz (1999) suggest that
since stock splits reduce share price resulting in higher commission fee per share, they draw
greater attention from security analysts. Because the primary role of the analysts is to generate
information, more firm- specific information is revealed subsequent to the split announcements.
In addition, Desai and Jain (1997) find that the majority of firms splitting stocks increase their

1

See Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969), Bar-Yosef and Brown (1977), McNichols and Dravid (1990),
Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) and Desai and Jain (1997).
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cash dividends subsequent to the announcements. They conclude that stock splits convey
information about near-term cash dividend growth.
On the other hand, the trading range theory advocates that splits realign per-share prices
to a preferred price range. This preferred price range is mainly justified on the basis that it
improves liquidity and marketability. This theory is also supported by managers surveyed by
Baker and Gallagher (1980) and Baker and Powell (1993). Managers believe that, by lowering
share prices, firms make their stocks more affordable to smaller investors and hence broaden the
stockholders’ base. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) find that splitting firms experience stock price
run- ups prior to the announcements and the share price after splits are comparable to the average
share price of other firms in the industry. A lower share price also improves trading liquidity by
increasing numbers of shares traded and converting odd- lot holders to round- lot holders.
D’Mello, Tawatnuntachai, and Yaman (2003) find that firms split stock to make the subsequent
SEO more marketable to individual investors who are attracted to low-priced shares. The trading
range hypothesis and liquidity/marketability hypothesis are not mutually exclusive explanations.
Individuals may have a preference for a specific trading range because liquidity is higher at that
price range.
Despite the rich literature on the theories of stock splits, studies have omitted public
utility firms from their analysis and only analyzed split by industrial firms when examining
managerial motives for splitting their stock. However, several studies in the financial literature
address the differences between public utility industry and other industries when examining
market reaction to announcement of other corporate events. 2 Asquith and Mullins (1986) and
Masulis and Korwar (1986) study the share price response associated with the issuance of new
equity for utility companies and how these results differ from industrial companies. They find
2

Filbeck and Hatfield (1999), Asquith and Mullins (1986), Masulis and Korwar (1986).
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that industrial firms experience larger negative excess returns than utility firms. Both studies
suggest that the information asymmetry is much lower for utility firms than industrial firms since
the former are subject to regulation. Szewczyc (1992) concludes that regulation of public
utilities may affect the market’s response to announcement of security offerings.
Public electric utility industry has been deregulated starting with the enactment of the
Energy Policy Act (EPACT) of 1992. Changes in the regulatory process, resulting from EPACT,
have opened a window of opportunity for the study and comparison of the two traditional
motives for splitting stock --signaling versus liquidity- marketability motives. Public electric
utility firms provide a clean testing ground for these two non- mutually exclusive theories as
liquidity/marketability hypothesis should dominate before the enactment of the EPACT since the
conventional signaling theory of common stock splits should not apply given the low levels of
information asymmetry in regulated utility companies. 3 In the post-EPACT period, however, the
signaling effect is expected to play a more dominant role. In other words, the liquidity and
marketability motives should play a more important role in the pre-EPACT era, while signaling
motive should dominate in the post- EPACT era due to the increase of information asymmetry.
Two major hypotheses that I propose to test in this dissertation are as follows. First, in the
pre-EPACT period, the announcement effect of stock splits would be lower than similar
announcements by industrial firms; while in the post-EPACT period, the announcement effect
related to stock splits between the two groups would be similar. Second, in the pre-EPACT era,
the liquidity- marketability motive dominates behind stock splits by electric utilities as opposed to
post-EPACT era when signaling motive is expected to dominate.

3

Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and Korwar (1986) suggest that the level of information asymmetry is
much lower for utility firms than industrial firms since the former are subject to regulation.
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My sample consists of 158 electric and gas utilities with stock splits during 1986- 2002
period.

The results show that the stock price reaction to announcement of public utility splits is

significantly positive but lower than the excess returns found for industrial stock splits during the
1986 through 2002 period. When the sample is broken down into pre- EPACT period (19861992) and post- EPACT period (1993-2002), I find that the market reaction is always greater for
industrial stock splits than public utility splits regardless of the time period. This is consistent
with the idea that regulation of public utilities may affect the market’s response to announcement
of corporate events and also the findings of previous studies in the context of other corporate
events.
I test the signaling hypothesis by examining the announcement period return, the relation
between split factors and abnormal returns, and the changes in operating performance of the
splitting firms. Finding significant abnormal excess stock returns, a positive relation between
split factors and abnormal return, and abnormal increase in earnings around the split are
consistent with signaling explanations. The marketability and liquidity argument is tested by
examining the changes in prices before and after the split, the number of shareholders, and
trading volume.
Based on both univariate and multivariate analyses, my results are consistent with the
hypothesis posed. For the pre-EPACT period, liquidity motive seems to predominate in
explaining the abnormal announcement return of utility stock splits. On the other hand, signaling
motive dominates as a leading explanation of abnormal returns in the post- EPACT period.
The rest of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 reviews previous literature
related to both stock split announcements and the regulated utility industry; Chapter 3 explains
the motivations for stock splits on regulated industries and discusses testable hypotheses;

4

Chapter 4 describes the methodology used to test the hypotheses; Chapter 5 provides data
description; Chapter 6 analyzes the results and Chapter 7 summarizes and concludes the
dissertation.
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CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

This Chapter is divided into two sections. In section 2.1, I present the theories that
explain the positive effect of stock split announcements and the literature supporting these
theories. In section 2.2, I give an overview of the utility industry, which includes the EPACT
and its impact on information asymmetry and empirical evidence on utility companies.

2.1. Theories of stock splits
Stock splits represent a puzzling phenomenon. After a split, the number of shares
outstanding increases but the corporation’s cash flows is unaffected. Each shareholder retains
his/her proportional ownership of shares, and the claims of other classes of security holders are
unaltered, yet the market reacts positively to stock splits announcements. Two theories, the
signaling theory and the trading range theory have emerged in the finance literature as the
leading explanations for splitting stock.

2.1.1. Signaling theory
According to the signaling theory, firms split stocks to convey favorable private
information about their current value. Finding positive excess returns around split
announcements would be consistent with this hypothesis.
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll (1969) study firms that announce stock splits during the
period of 1927 through 1959. They find that splitting firms experience an increase in cash
dividends subsequent to the announcement. Over 72 percent of the firms in their sample pay

6

higher cash dividend in the year subsequent to the announcement than the average security listed
on the New York Security Exchange. Their study supports the idea that stock splits reveal
information about an imminent increase in cash dividends. Fama et al. (1969) also find
abnormal returns around the split month, suggesting that the market considers stock split good
news because the announcements resolve uncertainty of cash dividend increase.
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) argue that previous studies (Fama et al., 1969;
Bar-Yosef and Brown, 1977) may not accurately reflect the effects of stock splits announcements
since they use monthly instead of daily data. Also, both Fama et al. (1969) and Bar-Yosef and
Brown (1977) do not control for potential effects of other information such as merger, earnings,
and dividend release around stock split announcements. To correct for these problems, Grinblatt
et al. (1984) examine a special subsample of splits for which no other announcement were made
on split declaration date (obtained from CRSP) and two days after the declaration date. They
find consistent results with the previous literature (Fama et al., 1969; Bar-Yosef and
Brown,1977) that splitting firms experience abnormal returns during the announcement period.
Specifically, they find an average increase in shareholders wealth of about 3.9% in the two days
around the split announcement. This significant positive announcement effect leads them to
hypothesize that firms signal information about their future earnings or equity values through
their split decision. Contrary to Fama et al. (1969), Grinblatt et al. (1984) find that
announcement returns cannot be explained by forecast of near term cash dividend increases.
Two-day announcement period returns are not significantly related to subsequent cash dividend
change, but are positively related to split factor, and negatively related to firm size and returns
prior to the announcement. The significant coefficient on firm size confirms the hypothesis that,

7

because of their higher levels of information asymmetry, smaller firms’ stock split
announcements contain greater information.
Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) study a sample of 121 firms that announced stock
splits during 1970 through 1980 that never paid cash dividend before the split announcement
date. Similar to Grinblatt et al. (1984), they report that the majority of their sample (81 percent)
do not pay cash dividends during a five-year period after stock splits and only 9 percent of their
total sample initiates cash dividends within a year after the announcement. Nevertheless, the
same sample of firms experience unusual earnings growth for several years prior to split
announcements and the increase in earnings continues for at least four years subsequent to the
announcement. Therefore, Asquith et al. (1989) conclude tha t stock split announcements reveal
information about future earnings, rather than future cash flows.
Brennan and Copeland (1988) expand the study of stock-split behavior with a model in
which the split serves as a signal of managers’ private information because stock trading costs
depend on stock prices. They use Ross’s (1977) argument that for a signal to be valid, it must be
costly to mimic. Brennan and Copeland (1988) signaling theory rests on the assumption that
stock splits are costly because the fixed cost element of brokerage commission increases the pershare trading costs of low-priced stocks. In addition, investors who previously owned round lots
will pay higher fees for odd lots after split announcements. Therefore, managers will trade off
the benefits derived from an increase in the firm’s share price with an increase in transaction
costs. Managers who observe the true value of the firm’s cash flow choose a target price, which
is defined as the preannouncement share price divided by the split factor. The empirical
evidence supports the prediction of their model that trading costs increase subsequent to the
announcement. Further, they find that the announcement period returns are significantly related
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to the number of shares outstanding following stock splits, suggesting that the number of shares
that will result after the split supply a useful signal to investors about managers’ private
information.
Following the same line of research, Brennan and Hughes (1991) develop a new model in
which they predict that the flow of information about firms is an increasing function of firm size
and a decreasing function of share price. Under the typical structure of brokerage fees based on
number of shares traded, security analysts tend to do more research on firms with low share
prices as they are likely to fetch higher commissions per share. Thus, by splitting their stock and
reducing share price, firms can draw more attention from investment brokers. Only those
managers with private good information have the incentive to call the attention of security
analysts so that they forecast earnings to investors. One of the assumptions of the model is that
investors will only purchase those stocks they know about. Thus, the role of security analysis is
assumed by brokers who receive compensation for their efforts in the form of brokerage
commissions from the investors who trade in the particular stocks. By examining a sample of
stock splits during 1976 through 1977, Brennan and Hughes (1991) find evidence supporting
their model; the number of analysts following firms is positively related to firm size and
negatively related to stock price.
Other studies such as McNichols and Dravid (1990) provide further evidence on the
signaling hypothesis by testing whether stock dividends and split factors convey information
about future earnings, and by testing whether the split factor itself is the signal. McNichols and
Dravid (1990) follow Spence’s (1973) and Riley’s (1979) signaling notion in which three
relations must hold in a fully revealing signaling equilibrium. In the first relation, the level of
the signal corresponds to the level of unobservable attribute. Therefore, McNichols and Dravid
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(1990) test whether the split factor reflects management’s priva te information about future
earnings. Management’s private information about earnings is proxied by analyst’s earnings
forecast error. This error is measured as the percent difference annual earnings reported after the
split and the median analysts’ pre-split earnings forecast. The second relation that must hold is
that agents’ inferences about the unobservable attribute correspond to the level of the signal.
They test this relation that investors inferences correspond to the split factor signal by testing for
a positive correlation between announcement period return prediction errors and an estimate of
the split factor signal. The third relation that must hold in the signaling equilibrium of
McNichols and Dravid (1990) is that inferences about the leve l of the unobserved attribute
correspond to the level of the unobserved attribute. Therefore, they test if there is a relation
between revision of investors’ beliefs about the value of the firm and the firm’s future earnings.
Looking at a sample compromised of stock dividends and splits occurring from 1976-1983, they
find evidence supporting the signaling hypothesis. Their results show that split factors are
significantly correlated with earnings forecast errors, suggesting that firms incorporate their
private information about future earnings in choosing their split factor. They also note that there
is a positive relationship between abnormal announcement returns and split factors, suggesting
that investors use split factors as a signal of future performance. The last test divides the split
factor signal into a component that is correlated with earnings forecast errors and an uncorrelated
component. McNichols and Dravid (1990) find that the announcement earning returns are
significantly correlated with split factors. Thus, they also find a significant coefficient on the
uncorrelated split factor, which suggests that other attributes are also signaled through split factor
choice. They conclude that earnings forecast errors measure management’s private information
about earnings with considerable error, or that a signaling explanation is incomplete.

10

A study by Han and Suk (1998) links the level of inside ownership of a firm with the
abnormal returns at the announcement of stock splits. They observe whether investors consider
the level of insider ownership of a firm as useful information for evaluating stock splits. If stock
splits signal management’s inside information, the credibility of the signal will vary depending
on different levels of managerial ownership. They first hypothesize a positive relation between
the level of insider ownership and the announcement effect of stock splits.

However, the level

of information asymmetry influences the extent to which investors find the knowledge of inside
ownership useful. Under the absence of information asymmetry, investors and managers have
the identical information set about firm’s prospects. Therefore, knowledge of insider ownership
is of little value to investors. Using firm size as a proxy for the level of information asymmetry,
they also hypothesize that the valuation effect of insider ownership should increase as firm size
decreases. While their first hypothesis predicts a positive relation between announcement effects
and the level of insider ownership, hypothesis 2 predicts that such a positive relation should be
more prominent for firms with higher information asymmetry. Using a sample of 262 splits
announced by NYSE and AMEX firms from 1983 to 1990 they find that split announcements by
firms with higher insider ownership have a more positive effect on the market than those by
firms with lower insider ownership. The average two-day abnormal return around the split
announcement is 4.2 percent for those firms with the highest insider ownership, compared with
0.9 percent for the portfolio with the lowest insider ownership. With respect to the joint effect of
insider ownership and information asymmetry, they find a significant positive relation between
announcement returns and insider ownership for small firms. This positive relation is not
observed within large firms. The results suggest that the market evaluates stock split decisions
within the joint context of insider ownership and information asymmetry.
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Szewczyk and Tsetsekos (1993) study the relationship between the level of institutional
ownership and the magnitude of the share price response to new equity issues by industrial firms.
They argue that institutional owners possess more information about the firm than individual
investors. As a result, announcements by firms with larger concentration of institutional
ownership should contain less information to the market, diminishing the market’s reaction to a
new stock issue. Results from industrial firms indicate that there is a direct relationship between
the level of institutional ownership and the market response to new equity issue. However,
Fielbeck and Hatfield (1999) find that there is a lack of relationship between the level of
institutional ownership and the magnitude of the share price response to the announcement of
new equity issue by public utility firms. They conclude that the regulatory nature of public
utilities reduces the role played by institutional investors in the reduction of information
asymmetry.

2.1.2. Trading range theory
A different explanation for the positive abnormal returns of stock splits is the trading
range theory. The trading range theory advocates that splits realign per-share prices to a
preferred price range. This preferred price range is mainly justified on the basis that it improves
marketability and liquidity. According to Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) trading ranges
might also arise for other reasons, including a desire by managers to increase ownership by
individual investors (Lakonishok and Lev, 1987) and a desire by firms to control relative tick
size at which their shares trade (Anshuman and Kalay, 1994; Angel, 1997; Shultz, 2000). Under
the trading range hypothesis, managers’ need to realign share prices usually stems from a pre-
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split price run-up. Therefore, this hypothesis links splits more to past performance than to future
performance.
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) suggest that there is an ideal range in which companies
prefer their stocks to be traded. The range is chosen to be comparable to the average stock price
in the industry. Since splitting firms experience unusual growth in earnings and dividends, their
stock prices increase beyond the customary trading range. Therefore, managers decide to split
their firms’ shares to restore stock prices to the range and thus increase trading liquidity.
Lakonishok and Lev (1987) compare the operational performance and other characteristics of
firms that split their stocks with those of a control group of nonspliting firms. Their results show
that, relative to control firms with the same four-digit SIC code and asset size, stock splits are
performed by firms that have enjoyed an unusual increase in stock prices over the five-year
period prior to the announcement. The main reason for the split appears to be the return of the
stock price to a normal range following a high growth period. In so doing, the firm affords small
investors the opportunity to purchase stocks at lower price in round lots. They also find that 32
percent of split factors are explained by pre-announcement stock price relative to the market and
the industry average prices. In terms of volume of trade or marketability, they look at the
monthly number of shares traded relative to the number of shares outstanding at the same date
for a given stock. Findings suggest that stock splits do not permanently affect the volume of
trade. Composition of stockholders and the number of stockholders are also other aspects of
marketability that might be affected by stock splits.
Mann and Moore (1996) develop a simple model supporting the trading range hypothesis.
They base their model on the assumption that firms split stocks to minimize total dollar trading
costs of both round and odd lots. Their empirical results are consistent with the predictions of the

13

model. They analyze NYSE and AMEX stock splits during the period 1967 to 1989. Mann and
Moore (1996) results show that firms with high institutional ownership experience greater presplit increases in share prices relative to those with high individual ownership. Consequently,
post-split share prices of firms in which the majority is owned by institutions are higher than
those of firms in which the majority is owned by individual investors. The rationale behind their
findings lies in the fact that institutions pay lower brokerage costs with high-priced stocks while
small investors are better off with low-priced stocks.
The trading range hypothesis of stock splits is also supported by survey-based research.
Based on a survey of chief financial officers of firms listed on New York Stock Exchange, Baker
and Gallagher (1980) report that around 65 percent of financial executives agree that the stock
split is a useful device to lower stock price. Consequently, a lower price is perceived as an
attraction to investors, broadening the ownership base. In a later study, Baker and Powell (1993)
survey managers of 251 NYSE and Amex firms who issued stock splits between 1988 and 1990.
They conclude that the most important motive of a split is to move the stock price into a better
trading range, while the second most important motive is to improve trading liquidity. However,
the empirical finding of Conroy, Harris, and Benet (1990) shows that managerial expectations
are not realized: indeed, splits result in decreased liquidity. The disparity between what
managers expect and what actually happens might be a result of how managers and empirics
view liquidity. Managers appear to define greater liquidity as increasing the number of
shareholders and widening the ownership base, whereas some empirical studies (Conroy et al.,
1990) appear to measure liquidity in terms of decreased bid-ask spreads.
Conroy et al. (1990) study the relationship between stock splits and shareholders liquidity
as measured by bid-ask spreads. By comparing 147 NYSE stocks that split with a random
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sample of 143 non-splitting NYSE stocks, they find that shareholders liquidity, measured by the
percentage bid-ask spread, is actually worse after stock splits. Two different tests are developed
in analyzing the changes in bid-ask spreads in their study. The first is a t-test comparing the
cross-sectional mean from the pre-announcement period to the cross sectional mean after the
split. The second test calculates for each stock the difference between the mean spread before
the announcement and after the ex-date. They conclude that the absolute bid-ask spread as a
percentage of closing stock price increases after the ex-date suggesting the existence of liquidity
costs. Conroy et al. (1990) suggest that the liquidity cost implies that stock splits are a valid
signal of favorable information.
Harris (1997) argues that a larger tick may be associated with fewer trading errors and
fewer misunderstanding about agreed- upon transaction prices. Having a larger tick size in
several ways may reduce the cost of market making. Thus an increase in the relative tick size
following a split implies a wider minimum spread. Schultz (2000) also addresses the traditional
explanation that stock splits increase the number of small shareholders as increased bid-ask
spreads give brokers higher incentives to promote the splitting firm’s stock. He hypothesizes
that a real consequence of a stock split is an increase in the tick size in proportion to the stock’s
price. This is an important change because a larger tick size may result in more profitable market
making, providing brokers with additional incentives to promote or sponsor the newly split
stock.

Schultz (2000) studies a sample of intraday trades and quotes around splits of 146

NASDAQ and 89 NYSE/AMEX stocks. The evidence shows that stocks are being promoted or
sponsored following a split. Therefore, his results are consistent with the notion that splits are
used to increase the shareholder base for a stock. Further, the increase in effective spreads
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appears to be accompanied by humble declines in some of the costs of making markets, which is
consistent with splits acting as an incentive to brokers to promote stocks.

2.1.3. Other theories
The tax option theory suggests that since stock splits increase trading liquidity due to
lower share prices and higher numbers of shares outstanding, they provide several opportunities
for investors to trade- in stocks and realize capital gains. Since investors benefit from these
options, there is a favorable reaction to the announcement.
Lamoureux and Poon (1987) suggest that, under the U.S. tax law during the pre-1985
period, investors preferred long-term capital gains to short-term. Therefore, a stock with a wide
price fluctuation has a higher value since investors have greater chances to manage their capital
gain or loss. According to Copeland (1979), the liquidity of a stock is actually reduced by a
split. Ohlson and Penman (1985) show that, subsequent to split ex-days, stock volatilities
increase by an average thirty- five percent. If this is the case, how can the positive reaction
around the announcement of stock splits be justified in light of increased risk and reduced
liquidity? Lamoureux and Poon (1987) explain this positive abnormal return in the context of
Constantinides’ (1984) “tax option” model.

According to this “tax option” model investors are

willing to pay a premium for securities with higher volatilities given the nature of the U.S. tax
code. Therefore, the tax-option value hypothesis predicts that subsequent to split
announcements, return volatility increases and an increase in volatility is positively related to the
announcement period returns. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) use empirical evidence based on
large stock splits during 1962 through 1985. Their results support the tax-option hypothesis in
which a significant increase in the number of shareholders, and the trading volume is observed
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around the announcement of a split. Thus, there is an increase in volatility that is diversifiable or
desirable, particularly to those investors in high tax brackets, as it expands their tax opportunities
of owning the stock. They further predict that the market reaction to stock splits would be lower
under the 1986 Tax Reform Act that treats capital gains and ordinary income equally, thereby
eliminating the tax option available to investors.
Ikenberry et al. (1996) study the “self selection” hypothesis as a synthesis of the trading
range and signaling theories. They do not treat the signaling and the trading range hypothesis as
mutually exclusive, instead they contend that managers use splits to move share prices into a
trading range, but condition their decision to split on expectations about the future performance
of the firm. Their sample includes 1,275 two- for-one stock splits announced by NYSE and ASE
firms between 1975 and 1990. Their results show that nearly four out of five sample firms
traded at prices at or above the 80th percentile in comparison to firms of similar size. This price
run- up prior to the split announcement suggests that firms split their shares after experiencing a
dramatic increase in stock price. Thus, post-split prices are generally lower tha n the median
price observed for firms of comparable size in the same four-digit SIC code. These results
support the view that splits are generally used to realign share prices to a normal trading range.
In order to study the signaling hypothesis, Ikenberry et al. (1996) also measure long-run
performance. First, they find a 3.38 percent five-day announcement return, which confirms prior
research that splits convey favorable information. Their stock split sample generates a
significant excess return of 7.93 percent in the first year after the split, and excess returns of
12.15 percent in the three years following the split. Finally, their results suggest that splits
realign prices to a lower trading range, but managers self-select by conditioning their decision to
split on expected future performance.
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Other papers (Rozeff, 1998; Fernando, Krishnamurthy, and Spindt, 1999) examine
different theories of stock splits using evidence from mutual funds. Rozeff (1998) uses a sample
of 120 mutual fund stock splits during 1965 through 1990. He develops new explanations for
the mutual fund split. The four major theories that appear in the literature, namely signaling,
trading range, tick size, and tax-options do not apply in the context of mutual funds. The
signaling theory does not apply because there is no higher cost of transaction at lower prices for
mutual funds. The trading range argument too falls short in justifying splits as liquidity is not a
major concern for mutual funds. However, liquidity is not a consideration within mutual funds.
For the most part, shares of mutual funds are easily traded or redeemed without any additional
cost. Tick size is a different consideration included in the literature of stock splits that do not
apply in the context of mutual fund splits as mutual funds have a continuous tick size. Therefore,
Rozeff (1998) includes three different explanations for mutual fund stock splits. The first
explanation is money illusion, in which investors might stay away from high-priced mutual fund
stocks because they believe that a high price makes it more likely that the price can decline. The
second explanation is that the fund expects to make high capital gains tax distributions in the
future. By attracting new investors who buy into the tax liability, current shareholders benefit.
The third explanation is that shareholders tend to prefer to have more shares than a fraction. It is
more convenient for shareholders to have more shares with a lower price than fewer shares with
a higher price in case they decide to make a gift of shares or liquidate small amounts.
Rozeff (1998) concludes that the money illusion hypothesis does not hold. Under this
hypothesis, there should be fewer shareholders and/or fewer assets under management for funds
with prices higher than average prices, which is not the case. His results also show that about
100 mutual funds split in a given year, and the most popular split factor is two for one as with
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common stocks. This frequency of mutual fund splits is far less than that of common stock
splits, suggesting that company managers have more compelling reasons to split than fund
managers. As in the case of common stock, mutual fund splits occur in high-priced funds after
unusually high returns. The post splitting results however differ from common stock splits.
Mutual fund splits do not subsequently outperform non-splitting funds.

Finally, he finds that

post-split number of shareholders and assets do not increase compared with funds having similar
rates of asset growth. However, mutual fund splits bring per account shareholdings back up to
normal levels.

2.2. Utility industry
The basic difference between industrial companies and utility companies is the regulatory
process. Utility companies are regulated primarily by the state regulatory commissions as well
as federal regulation agencies. Although the extent of regulation varies somewhat from state to
state, the general purpose of regulation is to make sure that customers get safe and reliable
service at a reasonable price. Furthermore, they act to balance the interest of the customer and
the shareholder. 4
State commissions in forty- four states are authorized to regulate the issuance of public
utility securities. 5 However, stock splits are not regulated by state commissions. According to
the Division of Investment Management of the Security and Exchange Commission, utility
companies that split go through the same procedure as ordinary companies. They file proxy

4

A detailed explanation of the theories of regulation can be found on Appendix A.
From the National Association of Regulatory Utility Commissioners (NARUC) compilation of Utility Regulatory
Policy 1991-1992. Regulatory commissions do not have authority over the issuance of securities in Alaska,
Delaware, Iowa, Mississippi, North Dakota and Texas.
5
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statements, ask shareholders for formal approval of the split, and adjust their accounting in
accordance with SEC procedures.

2.2.1. EPACT and its impact on information asymmetry.
In 1992 Congress enacted the Energy Policy Act (EPACT) to encourage the development
of a competitive, national, wholesale electricity market with open access to transmission
facilities owned by utilities to both new wholesale buyers and new generators of power. In
addition, the EPACT reduced the regulatory requirements for new non-utility generators and
independent power producers. The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission initiated rulemaking
to encourage competition for generation at the wholesale level by assuring that bulk power could
be transmitted on existing lines at cost-based prices. Under this legislation and rulemaking
generators of electricity, whether utilities or private producers, could market power from
underutilized facilities across state lines to other utilities.
In general, as an industry is deregulated, managers are less subject to subsidized controls
by regulatory agencies that otherwise acted as a substitute for internal governance mechanisms.
Moreover, managers in a deregulated environment are less subject to close supervision by
regulatory agencies and are not required to have full disclosure of information. As a
consequence, it is expected to be more difficult for the public to observe and judge manager’s
actions.

Kim (1998) lists different factors for the increase of information asymmetry in

deregulated markets. For instance, after deregulations managers have more opportunities for
discretionary actions which are completely unknown to the public. Government intervention
determines firms strategy and imposes constraints upon strategic decisions. Therefore, the
strategic decision-making shifts away from managers to public officials. In contrast, when
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markets are deregulated restrictions imposed on strategic moves disappeared increasing the
sensitivity of firm value to managerial decisions.

2.2.2. Empirical evidence on utility companies.
In this section, I address two different issues in the financial literature with regards to the
differences between public utility industry and other industries. First, I look at the market
response to new equity issues by utility companies. Then, the capital structure of a regulated
firm is addressed.

A) Share price response to new equity issue by utility companies.
A number of studies investigate the share price response associated with the issuance of
new equity for utility companies and how these results differ from industrial companies (Asquith
and Mullins, 1986; Masulis and Korwar, 1986; Filbeck and Hatfield, 1999). Asquith and Mullins
(1986), and Masulis and Korwar (1986) both find that industrial firms experience larger negative
excess returns than utility firms. Both studies suggest that the information asymmetry is much
lower for utility firms than industrial firms since the former are subject to regulation.
Filbeck and Hatfield (1999) investigate the relationship between the level of institutional
ownership and the magnitude of the share price response to new equity issues by public utility
firms. They argue that due to the regulatory environment that exists for public utility companies,
the monitoring role of institutional investors is mitigated. They look at a sample of 325 stock
issues by public utility companies from 1977 to 1994. They hypothesize that the number of
institutional investors and the proportion of shares owned by institutional investors are
insignificant related to the two-day abnormal return of stock issue by public utility companies.
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The ability of institutional shareholders to signal information about a new equity issue is
superseded by the presence of regulation. Their results show that there is a lack of relationship
between the level of institutional ownership and the magnitude of the share price response to the
announcement of a new equity issue by a public utility firm.

B) Capital structure of a regulated firm
A different issue that is also addressed in the literature regarding to the difference
between the utility industry and other industries is the effect of regulation on capital structure.
Taggart (1981) analyses possible “price- influence” effects of a regulated firm’s capital
structure. For a firm subject to rate-of-return regulation, the output price is set by an outside
agency so as to yield a “fair” return to providers of capital, and, if effective, this process reduces
monopoly profits. But if the regulator’s price-setting rule depends on the firm’s capital structure
in some predictable way, the firm may be able to influence price and hence earn additional
profits by choosing its financing mix. Taggart (1981) shows that firms have the incentive to
change their capital structures given the regulated environment, specifically under rate-of return
regulation. The magnitude of the change depends on the specific details of regulatory pricesetting procedures.
Spiegel and Spulber (1994) create a model of the regulatory process in which the capital
structure of firms plays a role in the strategic interaction between regulators and firms. He
suggests that firms choose a positive amount of debt as a consequence of regulation despite the
presence of high bankruptcy costs. Debt serves to raise the regulated rate-of-return as the
regulators seek to reduce expected bankruptcy costs. Thus, he shows that the regulated firm
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invests less than the social optimal level, which in turn raises regulated rates above the optimal
level.
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CHAPTER 3
HYPOTHESES

Information asymmetry and the resulting signaling implication associated with various
managerial decisions have repeatedly been tested on industrial firms. Up until 1993, electric
utilities were regulated and consequently, researchers considered the level of information
asymmetry in utility firms to be less pronounced than firms in unregulated industries. In studying
signaling implications of corporate events, most researchers, therefore, excluded utility firms
(see Conroy, Harris, and Benet, 1990; Maloney and Mulherin, 1992). A few studies that have
included utilities in their analyses find evidence of lower signaling effect from managerial
decisions of firms in the utility industry. For example, Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis
and Korwar (1986) study the share price response associated with the issuance of new equity for
utility companies and how these results differ from industrial companies. They find that
industrial firms experience larger negative excess returns than utility firms. Both studies suggest
that the information asymmetry is much lower for utility firms than industrial firms since the
former are subject to regulation.
The regulatory environment for electric utilities has changed dramatically with the
enactment of the EPACT in 1992. This act encourages the development of a competitive,
national, wholesale electricity market with open access to transmission facilities owned by
utilities to both new wholesale buyers and new generators of power. The benefits of competition
insured that more open markets for generation would spread creating diversity among generators.
Before the enactment of the EPACT, the regulatory environment alleviated information
asymmetry among economic agents. In the post- EPACT era, managers are less subject to
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monitoring by regulatory agencies that otherwise acted as a substitute for internal governance
mechanisms. Moreover, increased competition resulting from the EPACT leads firms to be
more responsive to consumer demands, monitor costs more closely, and compete on the basis of
price. 6

As a consequence, it is expected to be more difficult for the public to observe and judge

managers’ actions. Therefore, after the enactment of the EPACT the characteristics of this
environment change increasing the levels of information asymmetry between managers and
investors. Kim (1998) lists different factors for the increase of information asymmetry in
deregulated markets. For instance, in a regulated market, government intervention determines
firm’s strategy and imposes constraints upon strategic decisions. In contrast, when markets are
deregulated restrictions imposed on strategic moves disappeared increasing the sensitivity of
firm value to managerial decisions. Managers have more opportunities for discretionary actions
which are completely unknown to the public. Therefore, the strategic decision-making shifts
away from public officials to managers. A low level of information symmetry in the pre-EPACT
era and increased information asymmetry in the post-EPACT period provide a clean backdrop to
test signaling hypothesis linked to many managerial decisions. A firm’s decision to split stocks is
one of such decisions.
There is strong evidence that points to investors’ positive reaction to the announcements
of stock splits (see, among others, Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll, 1969; Bar-Yosef and Brown,
1977; McNichols and Dravid, 1990; Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice, 1996; and Desai and Jain,
1997). This evidence suggests that there are benefits associated with splitting stocks. Two major
theories have emerged in the financial literature to explain the positive abnormal returns at the
announcements of stock splits-- the signaling theory and the trading range theory.
6

Gegax, D., and Nowotny, K. (1993) ``Competition and the Electric Utility Industry: An Evaluation.'' Yale Journal
of Regulation 10: 63-88.
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The signaling theory posits that firms split their shares to reveal favorable future
information. Empirical work in this area finds strong evidence of the presence of signaling effect
related to stock splits by industrial firms. (see, among others, Asquith, Healey, and Palepu, 1989;
Brennan and Hughes, 1991; Desai and Jain, 1997; and Schultz, 2000). The trading range theory
advocates that splits realign per-share prices to a preferred price range. This preferred price
range is mainly justified on the basis that it improves liquidity and marketability. This theory is
also supported by managers surveyed (see Baker and Gallagher, 1980; and Baker and Powell,
1993) as well as empirical findings (see, among others, Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; and D’Mello,
Tawatnuntachai, and Yaman, 2003). Based on their sample of American Depository Receipts
(ADR), Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) conclude that liquidity argument prevails in
explaining the positive reaction to stock split announcement, since ADRs can not be motivated
by any managerial desire to signal favorable information.
In this dissertation, I examine both the signaling argument and the liquidity/marketability
argument by comparing the pre-EPACT period with the post-EPACT period. As such, my
approach is an improvement on the approach taken by Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996). This
is so because this dissertation can better distinguish between signaling and
liquidity/marketability motives for stock splits simultaneously within the same sample, given the
changes in the level of information asymmetry experienced by the electric utility firms.
In this dissertation, I test three major hypotheses. The first hypothesis is

H1 :

The excess return related to stock split announcement would be lower
for electric utilities than their industrial counterpart in the pre-EPACT
period, while in the post-EPACT period the difference in excess returns
between the two groups would be lower.
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The rationale behind this hypothesis is as follows. Asquith and Mullins (1986) and Masulis and
Korwar (1986) find that industrial firms experience larger negative excess returns than utility
firms in reaction to the issuance of new equity. They attribute this result to lower information
asymmetry in utility firms due to regulation. Since before 1992 regulation prevailed and it started
dissipating after 1992, the underlying expectation in H1 is justified.
Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984) and Ikenberry, Rankine, and Stice (1996) conclude
that stock splits employed by firms with high level of information asymmetry convey more
information and thus the market reacts more positively to their announcements. This leads to my
second hypothesis.

H2 :

The excess return related to stock split announcement would be lower in
the pre-EPACT period than the post-EPACT period.

My third hypothesis is in the same vein as the first two in that it stems from level of information
asymmetry in the two periods.

H3 :

In the pre-EPACT period the liquidity motive of stock split dominates for
electric utilities while in the post-EPACT period the signaling motive is
dominant.
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CHAPTER 4
METHODOLOGY

The methodology section is composed of four different sub-sections. In sub- section 4.1 I
test hypothesis 1 by looking at the market reaction to public utilities stock split announcement.
In sub-section 4.2 I explain the signaling measures which include the procedure for calculating
changes in operating performance. Sub-section 4.3 presents the liquidity measures used in the
study. Finally, in sub-section 4.4 I discuss the regression analysis.

4.1. The market reaction to public utility stock splits
To capture price responses around split announcement, for each company j, I form a three
day cumulative abnormal return (ARj ) centered on the split announcement day. This abnormal
announcement period return is defined as the return in excess of the value-weighted market
return cumulated over the three-day window. ARj is calculated as the sum of daily abnormal
returns (arjt ) where

arjt = rjt – rmt

(1)

r = Daily return on a stock;
rm = Daily return on the value-weighted CRSP index;
t = Day relative to the split announcement day (t = 0).
The market-adjusted model is used to calculate the abnormal announcement period return
since Brown and Warner (1985) find no significant difference between this model and the market
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model. Thus, Campbell, Ederington, and Vankudre (1991) find that there is an upward bias in
the intercept term of the market model parameter that lowers estimates of abnormal
announcement period returns due to the significant run-up in stock prices in the period before the
split.

4.2. Signaling measures
This study tests the signaling hypothesis by looking at the relation between split factors
and abnormal return, and the changes in operating performance of the splitting firms. Asquith,
Healy, and Palepu (1989) find that splitting firms experience earnings growth for at least four
years subsequent to the announcement. In addition, Desai and Jain (1997) show that splitting
shares significantly outperform by about 7 percent in the year following the split and by about 12
percent in the three years following the split. Rozeff (1998) finds that splitting funds do not
subsequently outperform non-splitting funds. He argues that this result is inconsistent with
managerial signaling. Therefore, it is important to study post-split operating performance of
utility stock splits to access whether managers deliberately attempt to convey information when
they announce a split. Abnormal Operating Performance for short-run (AOS) and long-run
(AOL) are defined as follows:

AOS =

O0 − O −1 MedO0 − MedO−1
−
TA -1
MedTA−1

(2)

AOL=

O +2 − O −1 MedO+ 2 − MedO−1
−
TA -1
MedTA−1

(3)

O= Operating income before depreciation;
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TA= Standardized variable, total assets measure;
Med= Median firm in the industry;
Subscripts -1= Fiscal year-end prior to the announcement;
Subscripts 0= Fiscal year-end immediately after the announcement;
Subscripts +2= Two fiscal year-end after the announcement.
Therefore, the short-term (long-term) abnormal operating performance measures the one
year (three year) difference between the standardized operating performance of the splitting
sample and the standardized median operating performance of the industry. Where the industry
is defined as all companies within the 4900s SIC codes that have not split within the sample
period.

4.3. Liquidity measures
The literature on stock splits has used different proxies for liquidity. For instance, by
using trading volume as a proxy of liquidity, Copeland (1979) and Lamoureux and Poon (1987)
find that dollar trading volume declines after OTC, NYSE, and AMEX stock splits. Conroy,
Harris and Benet (1990) report that there is a decrease in split-adjusted volume following a stock
split, while Arnold and Lipson (1997) find that trading volume increase subsequent to a stock
split. Share price volatility, as a measure of liquidity, has been shown to increase following a
stock split (Conroy, Harris, and Benet, 1990; Desai, Nimalendran, and Venkataraman, 1998;
Dubofsky, 1991).
Another measure of market liquidity is the relative bid-ask spread supported by traders.
Copeland (1979), Conroy, Harris, and Benet (1990) and Desai, Nimalendran, and Venkataraman
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(1998) find that bid-ask spread expressed as a percentage of stock price increases after a split,
indicating a decline in liquidity, while Murray (1985) provides no evidence of such an effect.
In this study I use two measures of liquidity, change in the number of shareholders and
trading patterns around public utility stock splits. The change in the number of shareholders is
calculated between the fiscal year-end before and after the split ex-date. For the study on trading
patterns, I follow Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) and collect all trades for 120 trading days
before and after the split ex-date for my sample of electric utility firms. By examining pre and
post-split characteristics of the full sample of all transactions, I am able to identify whether or
not small investors might have become more active in the market after the split as result of
liquidity improvements.

4.4. Regression analysis
The next step is to analyze the cross-sectional variation in the price reactions to the stock
split announcements. A linear regression is estimated where firm characteristics, split factor,
price run- up, percentage change in the number of shareholders, firm asset value, and change in
operating performance are included as independent variables. I will run the following
regression:

AR = a + ß1 SPLIT + ß 2 RUNUP + ß 3 LNAT + ß 4 ∆SHO
+ ß 5 ∆OPER + et

(4)

AR= Three-day announcement period return;
a= Intercept;
ß1, … ß 5= Coefficients;

31

SPLIT= Size of split factor;
RUNUP= Stock price increase from day -120 to day -6;
LNAT= Natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets;
∆SHO= Percentage change in the number of shareholders;
∆OPER= Abnormal change in operating performance;
and e = Error term.
LNAT is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets the fiscal year-end previous to the split
announcement 7 , ∆SHO is the percentage change in the number of shareholders from the fiscal
year-end previous to the split announcement to the fiscal year-end immediately after the split,
and ∆OPER is the one- year abnormal change in operating performance defined in section 4.2
above.
By using these variables I test the liquidity versus the signal motive of splitting stocks.
Both, the price run-up and the change in the number of share holder variables are testing whether
abnormal returns can be explained by changes in liquidity and marketability after the split. The
variable run-up measures the stock price increase from day -120 to day -6. If the stock price
increase is abnormally large, then managers will be inclined to split their stocks to bring share
prices to a typical trading range. Thus, this variable acts as a forecast of the forthcoming stock
split. Hence, RUNUP should be negatively related to the announcement returns of stock splits
according to the marketability hypothesis. On the other hand, the change in the number of
shareholders is predicted to be positive under the liquidity hypothesis.
The next three variables, total assets, change in operating performance, and size of the
split factor, are included in this regression to examine whether investors view splits as a signal of
7

Lakonishok and Lev (1987) observe that total assets is a more reliable measure of size than market value, which
generally increases substantially in the period before the split announcement.
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future performance. Following Grinblatt et al. (1984), I include firm size to test whether
investors perceive split announcements from smaller firms somewhat different than
announcement from larger firms. The split announcement of smaller firms should create greater
market interest than it would in the case of larger firms since the former have fewer
announcements published in the financial media and therefore, are less followed. Hence, there
should be an inverse relationship between announcement period abnormal returns and the size of
the firm. Signaling explanations are consistent with abnormal increase in earnings and/or
dividends after the split. Thus, abnormal excess returns are observed at the split announcement
because investors implicitly conclude that the split decision signals manager’s belief that stock
prices will continue to increase given future increase in earnings.

The following variable, split

factor SPFAC, has been used in a number of studies. 8 These studies find a positive relation
between SPFAC and announcement returns. Larger split factors represent bigger percentage
moves from the current price. Therefore, SPFAC is expected to be positively related to the
announcement return.

8

See McNichols and Dravid (1990), Ikenberry et al. (1996), for example.
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CHAPTER 5
DATA DESCRIPTION

In section 5.1 I describe the data selection criteria. In section 5.2 I discuss some of the
financial and asset characteristics of the sample of public utility splitting firms and compare them
with non-splitting firm.

5.1. Data
The data for this study were drawn from two sources: the Center for Research in Security
Prices (CRSP) Daily Master Tape, and the annual Compustat Tape. This study focuses on
electric utility stock splits of five- for- four or greater that are listed on the American Stock
Exchange (AMEX), the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) and the National Association of
Securities Dealers Automated Quotation System (NASDAQ) from 1986 through 2002. 9 I
deleted 1 stock distribution with split factor less than 0.25. Table I presents the sample selection
criteria. Following Grinblatt, Masulis, and Titman (1984), the event date (day 0) is defined as
the earlier of the declaration date of the event on the CRSP daily master tape or the
announcement date in the Wall Street Journal. The split data is the CRSP distribution code 5523.
I include all electric and gas utility companies reported on CRSP under Standard Industrial
Classification (SIC) codes 4900 – 4939 for every year of the sample selection. Gas production
and distribution companies are included in this study due to the high degree of interconnection
between them and electricity suppliers. Thus, there are many mergers of electric utilities with

9

This study considers stock distributions of 25% or more as splits. According to generally accepted accounting
principles, stock distributions of 20% or less are considered ‘stock dividends’, which dramatically decrease a firm’s
retained earnings. For stock distributions between 20% and 25%, the accounting principles grant full discretion to
managers; however, most of these distributions are considered splits.
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natural gas utilities within the sample period justified on the basis of power source
diversification.

The final sample from CRSP includes 158 electric and gas utility stock splits.

Further, to eliminate the effects of contemporaneous announcements, I delete 50 observations for
which the Wall Street Journal Index reported earnings or dividend information during a threeday period from one day before to one day after the stock split announcement date (day 0). After
1998, the Wall Street Journal Index stopped the announcement of stock splits. Therefore, the
Mergent Public Utility Annual Report was used to verify the split announcement date.

These

screening procedures identify 108 observations. To remain in the sample for this study,
companies must have data available in the Compustat annual files. Of the original 80
companies, 70 meet these criteria. The final sample includes 95 electric utility stock splits (70
electric companies) during 1986 to 2002.
In addition to the test sample, a control sample is constructed by taken all companies
within the 4900’s SIC codes that did not split during the sample period. These criteria resulted
in 249 electric utility companies that did not split during 1986 and 2002.

5.2. Sample summary
Stock splits are quite a frequent event within public utility firms. Table II presents the
frequency of utility stock splits; that is, the number of splits dividend by the total number of
utility companies. This frequency varies from a low of 0.77 percent in 1995 to a high of 7.14
percent in 1987. Generally speaking, more splits are observed following bull markets. The
average annual frequency from 1986 through 2002 is 4.98 percent. Lakonishok and Lev (1987)
report that common stock split frequency averages 6.03 percent from 1963 through 1982,
ranging from a low of 1.75 percent in 1974 to a high of 11.43 percent in 1981.
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A recent study from Michayluk and Kofman (2001) find that the total number of stock
splits with a split factor of at least 25 percent rose by almost 300 percent from 245 in 1990 to 724
in 1998. However, the results for public utility firms show that the number of stock splits has not
increased in the last years of the sample.

Table I
Sample Selection Criteria
This table presents sample selection criteria, the number of splits and companies deleted under
each criterion. The final sample includes 70 electric utility companies that announced 95 stock
splits during 1986 to 2002.

Criteria

Number of
Splits

Number of
Companies

159

112

1

1

158

111

50

47

108

80

Data not available on Compustat

13

10

Final Sample

95

70

Electric and Gas Utilities stock splits (SIC
4900 - 4939) announced during 1986 and
2002 from CRSP
Split Factors less than 0.25
Original sample
Corporate announcement released during a
three day period centered around day 0a
Clean sample

a

The Wall Street Journal Index reported that 50 observations had earnings or dividend
information during a three-day period from one day before to one day after the stock split
announcement date (day0). These observations are deleted from the original sample to eliminate
the effects of contemporaneous announcements.
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The total number of electric utility companies has decreased from 247 in 1986 to 173 in
2002. This industry has undergone a major restructuring through mergers and acquisitions since
its deregulation in the 1990’s. Table III shows the number of delisting companies during 1986 to
2002. From the total number of mergers (160) during the sample period (1986-2002), 98 or 61.3
percent occurred during 1997 through 2002.

Table II
Annual Distribution of Electric Utility Stock Splits
The “Total Number of Utility Companies” column shows the total number of utility companies
reported on CRSP under SIC codes 4900 – 4999 for every year of the sample selection. The
column label “Number of Splits” shows the distribution by year of 108 electric utility stock splits
from 1986 through 2002. The “Split Frequency” column shows the frequency of electric utility
stock splits in a given year. That is, the number of splits divided by the total number of utility
companies.
Total Number of Utility
Number of
Split
Year
Companies
Splits
Frequency
1986

247

17

6.88

1987

252

18

7.14

1988

260

3

1.15

1989

253

8

3.16

1990

256

2

0.78

1991

254

2

0.79

1992

262

16

6.11

1993

258

12

4.65

1994

263

3

1.14

1995

261

2

0.77

1996

258

7

2.71

1997

256

2

0.78

1998

243

2

0.82

1999

229

5

2.18

2000
2001

208
182

4
3

1.92
1.65

2002

173

2

1.16

Total

108
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Table III
Delisting of Utility Companies, 1986-2002
The table shows the delisted number of utility companies by year during 1986 to 2002. The
‘Mergers’ column shows the number of companies with delisted codes 231,233, and 241 on CRSP
during the sample period. The ‘Insufficient Capital / Delinquent Filling’ column shows the
number of companies with delisting codes 560,561 and 580 on CRSP. The ‘Other’ column shows
all other delinquent codes on CRSP found for electric utility companies.

Delisted
Year

Mergers

Insufficient Capital
Delinquent Filling

1986

9

1

1

11

1987

0

2

0

2

1988

9

1

1

11

1989

5

1

0

6

1990

5

4

3

12

1991

2

2

0

4

1992

4

3

5

12

1993

7

2

1

10

1994

7

2

5

14

1995

9

3

1

13

1996

5

2

3

10

1997

15

4

4

23

1998

18

1

3

22

1999

18

4

6

28

2000
2001

31
8

1
2

4
2

36
12

2002

8

0

5

13

Total

160

35

44

239

Other

Total

Table IV shows the distribution of split factors in the 108 clean sample. Panel A shows
that the split factors are similar to the conventional split factors observed for common stocks,
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that is, two for one, three for two, four to three, etc 10 . Two for one split comprises 55.6 percent
of the clean splitting sample of utility stocks during the overall period, 1986-2002. The next
highest category is the three for two split at 39.8 percent. Panel B shows the distribution of split
factors during the pre- and post- EPACT periods, i.e., 1986-1992 and 1993-2002, respectively. 11
Basically, the most common split factor remains two for one with 54.7 percent for the 1986-1992
period and 57.1 percent for the 1993-2002 period of the sample. The next highest category is the
three for two for both sub-periods.

Table IV
Distribution of Electric Utility Splits by Split Factor, 1986-2002
The table shows the distribution of electric utility stock splits in the 108 clean sample in
categories of stock split factor. Data on split factors are from CRSP Daily Master Tape. The
split factor defined as the number of shares exchanged for the number of old share. Panel A
shows the distribution for the entire sample from 1986-2002. Panel B shows the distribution of
stock split factor for two different time periods.
Panel A: Overall Period
Split Factor

4– 3

3– 2

2– 1

3-1

1986 - 1992

4

43

60

1

2

27

36

1

2

16

24

0

(N= 108)

Panel B: Time Period
1986 - 1992
(N= 66)
1993 - 2002
(N= 42)

10
11

See Rozeff (1998).
The EPACT was passed on 1992 and implemented on January 1, 1993.
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Firm characteristics between the splitting and control sample are compared in Table V.
All variables are obtained from Compustat. Assets are measured as “total assets” (Compustat
item #A6), equity-book value as “book value of equity” (Compustat item #A60), equity- market
value as “market value – fiscal year-end”, earnings as “operating income before depreciation”
(Compustat item #A13), number of shares outstanding as “common shares outstanding”
(Compustat item #A25), and number of shareholders as “common shareholders” (Compustat
item #A100). All variables are measured at the fiscal year-end prior to the split announcement.
Even though median and mean results are reported on Table V, I concentrate only on
median results. In addition, the non-parametric Wilcoxon rank sum test is used to check the
statistical difference in median results between the two sub-samples. The results show that the
median split sample firm is larger in both market and book value of equity compared to the
median non-splitting firm. Splitting firms also experience more profitable performance, defined
as earnings available to shareholders, compared to non-splitting firms in the fiscal year-end
previous to the split announcement. These results are consistent with previous literature that
document that splitting firms are larger and experience abnormal positive performance in the
period before the split.
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Table V
Descriptive Statistics
The table presents descriptive statistics for selected variables for both splitting and non-splitting firms. Non-splitting firms are defined as firms in Compustat
within the 4900’s SIC codes that have not announced a split during the period of 1986 – 2002 on CRSP. All data is obtained from Compustat the fiscal yearend prior to the split announcement. All values except Number of shareholders (in thousands) are in million of dollars. The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z test
statistical differences in mean and median between the two groups. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Splitting Firms (N=95)

Variable

Assets

Mean
(Median)

Max.

Min.

2,477.08

33,409.00

27.43

Std. dev.

Mean
(Median)

Non-Splitting Firms (N=1,787)
Max.

Min.

Std. dev.

Difference
t-statistic
(Wilcoxon-Z)

4,414.30

4,152.96

80,265.15

0.22

8,164.76

-3.40***

(952.65)

Equity - Market Value

1,360.35

(582.75)
18,345.75

17.99

2,376.55

(509.28)

Equity – Book Value

740.70

94.33

8,998.00

8.73

1,279.75

73.56

847.00

-11.90

151.89

25.13

3,872.67

1,143.10

112.71

732.00

1.08

108.39

76.10

26,691.74

-418.76

2,299.27

0.05

33.48

(11.44)

35.81
(4.20)

41

-2.83***
(2.233**)

3,761.56

-3,299.00

295.23

-1.08
(3.814***)

1,280.20

0.00

158.59

(17.52)
167.83

-1.64*
(2.272**)

(10.30)

(27.69)

Number of Shareholders

0.48

(173.99)

(41.87)

Number of Shares Outstanding

50,020.37

(366.16)

(286.96)

Earnings

1,792.68

(2.038**)

-0.22
(2.488***)

775.96

0.00

69.04

-2.76***
(2.334***)

CHAPTER 6
RESULTS

This chapter is composed of 4 sections. In section 6.1 I study the market reaction to
public utility versus industrial stock splits. Section 6.2 analyses the impact of EPACT on
announcement return. Section 6.3 presents the tests of the signaling versus liquiditymarketability hypothesis. Finally, in section 6.4 I show the results of the multivariate analysis
and robustness check.

6.1. The market reaction to public utility versus industrial stock splits
I look at the announcement period return of utility stock splits versus their industrial
counterparts during the period of 1986 through 2002. Abnormal announcement period return is
defined as return in excess of the value-weighted market returns cumulated over the three-day
window. 12 In Table VI, the market reaction to public utility and industrial stock split
announcement is reported overall and by sub-periods for all firms. I find mean (median) increase
in stock prices of 1.471% (1.161%) at the split announcement of electric utilities during the
period of 1986 through 2002. Both mean and median abnormal returns are significantly different
from zero at one percent level indicating that splits are interpreted by the market as good news.
These results contradict the idea that splitting electric utility firms do not experience significant
abnormal returns around the stock split announcement.
The next step is to compare the abnormal announcement period return of utility firms
with other industrial firms. I use the same three-day cumulative abnormal return methodology
around the event window to calculate the market reaction to stock splits announcement of
12

See details in section 4.1.
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industrial firms. The mean (median) price reaction of 6,976 firms that reported announcements
of stock splits during the period of 1986 through 2002 on CRSP is 3.170% (2.126%). The
original sample of industrial firms included 6,997 firms with SIC codes different than 4900s. I
eliminate 21 firms for not having return information during the three-day window around the
split announcement date. The abnormal return is similar to that of Ikenberry et al. (1996) who
find a mean announcement return of 3.38% in their sample of common stock splits from 1975
through 1990. These results are consistent with the hypothesis that if there is a positive
abnormal return at the announcement of utility stock splits, (as indicated above) then the
abnormal return experienced at the announcement of stock splits is lower for utility than
industrial firms. This difference in mean and median abnormal returns between utilities and
industrial firms is statistically significant at one percent level.

6.2. Impact of EPACT on announcement return
I also examine whether the passage of the Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) has a
significant impact on announcement period return of utility stock splits given the change in
levels of information asymmetry. By allowing public utility companies to pursue growth
opportunities in less regulated markets, the Energy Policy Act increased the levels of information
asymmetry within this industry. I would therefore test the hypothesis that the excess return
related to stock split announcement would be lower for electric utilities than their industrial
counterpart in the pre-EPACT period, while in the post-EPACT period the difference in excess
returns between the two groups would be lower (H1 ). These results are expected given the lower
levels of information asymmetry within public utility firms.
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Table VI
Announcement Return of Electric Utility versus Industrial Stock Splits,
1986-2002
The table reports abnormal returns for electric utility and industrial stock splits announced
between 1986 –2002. Abnormal returns are calculated for each firm by taking the three-day
holding period return from one day before through one day after the announcement date, and
subtracting the three-day value-weighted CRSP index holding period return. Mean (median)
abnormal returns are reported overall and by time period. ***, ** denote significance at 1 and 5
percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Public Electric Utilities

Electric Utility Stock Splits

N

Abnormal
Return

t-Stat.

108

1.471

5.426***

(1.161)
Time period

1986 – 1992

66

1.773

4.927***

(1.256)
1993 - 2002

42

0.960

2.433**

(1.001)
Difference between periods
(Wilcoxon)

-1.572

Panel B: Industrial Firms

Industrial Stock Splits

6,976

3.170

38.394***

(2.126)
Time period

1986 – 1992

2,893

2.765

26.874***

(2.000)
1993 - 2002

4,083

3.457
(2.239)

44

28.669***

To determine the existence of any significant change in abnormal returns, I divide the
sample into pre- and post- EPACT periods, i.e., 1986-1992 and 1993-2002, respectively. The
mean (median) announceme nt return decreases from 1.773% (1.256%) in the 1986-1992 period
to 0.960% (1.001%) in the 1993-2002 period for the utility stock split sample. I also include the
Wilcoxon rank-sum test to check the statistical difference in mean abnormal returns between the
two periods in the combined data set. The statistic of -1.572 shows that abnormal returns are not
significantly different between the two periods. On the other hand, the mean (median)
announcement return for industrial firms increases from 2.765% (2.000%) in the pre-EPACT
period to 3.457% (2.239%) in the post- EPACT period.

Furthermore, these results are not

consistent with the hypothesis that the excess return related to stock split announcement would
be lower for electric utilities than their industrial counterpart in the pre-EPACT period, while in
the post-EPACT period the difference in excess returns between the two groups would disappear.
If the market perceives stock splits as a signaling mechanism, then the results should show a
greater abnormal return for the post- EPACT period when information asymmetry is greater due
to deregulation. If public utility splits do not serve as a signal mechanism prior to the enactment
of EPACT, then the results show that utility splits have value because of their liquidity benefits.
In summary, the stock price reaction to announcement of public utility splits is
significantly positive and lower than the excess returns found for industrial stock splits during
the 1986 through 2002 period. When the sample is broken down into pre- and post- EPACT
periods, the market reaction is greater for the pre- EPACT period when levels of information
asymmetry are lower than post-EPACT period. I interpret these excess returns for 1986-1992
period as the market’s reflection of the expected benefits from greater post-split liquidity.
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Table VII
Summary of Major Provisions after the Enactment of EPACT
Provision

Description

State Role in
Implementing
Retail
Competition

Deadline for
Retail
Competition

Power Bill
(introduced
2/10/1999)

To remove Federal
impediments to retail
competition in the electric
power industry, thereby
providing opportunities within
electricity restructuring.

Lead role in
deciding on retail
competition
reforms. Retains
role in protecting
public health and
safety.

No federally
imposed deadline.

Electric Utility
Restructuring
Empowerment
and
Competitiveness
Act of 1999
(introduced
3/3/1999)

A bill to benefit consumers by
promoting competition in the
electric power industry, and for
other purposes.

Lead role in
deciding on retail
competition
reforms. Retains
role in protecting
public health and
safety.

No federally
imposed deadline.

Electric
Consumer
Choice Act
(introduced
6/24/1999)

A bill to amend the Federal
Power Act to ensure that no
State may establish, maintain,
or enforce on behalf of any
electric utility an exclusive right
to sell electric energy or
otherwise unduly discriminate
against any consumer who
seeks to purchase electric
energy in interstate commerce
from any supplier.

Lead role in
deciding on
response to
withdrawal of any
exclusive
franchise
authority.

Federal Power Act
(FPA) authority for
exclusive state
franchises
removed January
1, 2002.

Electricity
Deregulation
bill (identified by
CRS)
(introduced
2/24/2000)

A bill to facilitate the transition
to more competitive and
efficient electric power
markets, and to ensure electric
reliability.

Lead role in
deciding on retail
competition
reforms. Retains
role in protecting
public health and
safety.

No federally
imposed deadline.

Consumer
Empowerment
and Electricity
Deregulation Act
of
2000(introduced
7/18/2000)

A bill to provide for retail
competition for the sale of
electric power, to authorize
States to recover transition
costs, and for other purposes.

Lead role in
designing retail
competition,
subject to
statutory criteria
and limitations.

Deadline of
January 1, 2002,
enforceable by
appeal to federal
court.
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Table VII gives a summary of the major provisions introduced after the enactment of the
EPACT. These provisions were mainly introduced during 1999 and 2000 and show that an
important reason for not seeing the evidence of narrowing abnormal returns at the announcement
of stock splits between utility and industrial firms (hypothesis 1) is that the EPACT is being
implemented slowly over the years.

6.3. Test of the signaling versus liquidity/marketability hypothesis
6.3.1. Tests of the signaling hypothesis
This section begins by testing the signaling hypothesis. Under this hypothesis managers
split their stock to convey favorable private information about their current value.I test the
signaling hypothesis by looking at the relation between split factors and abnormal return, and the
changes in operating performance of the splitting firms.

A) Split factors
As a test of the signaling hypothesis, I investigate whether managers use the split factor
to convey information about the firm’s future performance. Specifically, I test whether split
factors can explain the abnormal excess return observed after the announcement of public utility
stock splits. McNichols and Dravid (1990) and Conroy and Harris (1999) conclude that
managers employ the split factor to reveal information about future earnings improvements.
Rozeff (1998) suggest that mutual fund managers choose split factors that result in post-split
prices being in the conventional price range as defined by the prices of other mutual funds. He
concludes that higher split factors are associated with higher deviations of fund prices from the
existing mean of fund prices. Managers of mutual funds choose split sizes that bring fund prices
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near the means of existing prices. Assuming that managers use split factors to bring share prices
to a desired trading range and that investors use split factors as a signal for future performance, I
will test the hypothesis that there is a positive significant relationship between split factors and
abnormal returns around the announcement of utility stock split.
In order to understand how managers use split factor, that is, if they use split factors to
bring share prices to a desired trading range and that investors use split factors as a signal for
future performance, I regress the three day abnormal returns (AR) cross-sectional against the
split factor (SPFAC).

AR = a +ß SPFAC + e

(5)

Table VIII shows the regression results overall and by time period. Panel A shows that
the split factors explain only 0.8 percent of the abnormal returns. Although there is a positive
relation between the split factor and the abnormal return, the relation is not significant. The
results are quite different for the two sub-samples. Panel B shows that there is a negative
relation between split factors and abnormal returns for the pre-EPACT period of 1986-1992.
This negative relation is not significant. For the post-EPACT period, 1993-2002, the split factors
explain 3.4 percent of the abnormal returns. This positive relation is highly significant.
The results suggest that managers may use the split factor to convey information about
the firm’s future performance. Specifically, split factors can explain the abnormal excess return
observed after the announcement of public utility stock splits for the post-EPACT period when
levels of information asymmetry are higher. During this period signaling motives for splitting
stocks should prevail.
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Table VIII
Split Factors and Abnormal Returns
This table presents multivariate regression results overall and by time periods. The dependent
variable is the three-day value weighted abnormal return from one day before through one day
after the announcement date. The independent variable is the split factor. ***,** denote
significance at 1, and 5 percent levels, respectively.

AR = a +ß SPFAC + e
Panel A: Overall Period (1986-2002)
Coefficient

t-Stat.

Intercept

0.006

0.724

Split

0.008

0.758

Adjusted R-Square

0.005

Number of Observations

108

Panel B: Time Period

1986 - 1992
Intercept

0.040

2.824***

Split

-0.046

-0.947

Adjusted R-Square

0.128

Number of Observations

66

1993-2002
Intercept

-0.009

-0.916

Split

0.034

2.920***

Adjusted R-Square

0.104

Number of Observations

42
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The next section continues with the study of the signaling hypothesis by looking at the
operating performance of splitting firms one and two years after the split.

B) Changes in operating performance
Asquith, Healy, and Palepu (1989) find that stock split announcements convey earnings
information. In addition, Ikenberry et al. (1996) find that splits are associated with long-run
excess returns following the announcement period. They report a mean excess return of 7.93
percent and 12.15 percent in the first and third year after the split, respectively. Therefore, in
this section I test the signaling hypothesis by looking at the operating performance of public
utility firms after the split announcement. To find an abnormal or excess operating performance
would be consistent with signaling explanations. This excess operating performance for the
splitting sample is determined by subtracting the value of the median firm in the same industry.
Moreover, due to changes of information asymmetry after the enactment of EPACT, I expect to
find an increase in operating performance only for the post- EPACT period. I argue that
signaling motives can only be present after the deregulation process. Hence, I test whether
operating performance increases after the split announcement for the 1993-2002 period. I use
short term and long term operating performance. Short-term operating performance is defined as
operating income before depreciation at the fiscal year-end immediately after the split
announcement minus operating income before depreciation at the fiscal year-end prior to the
stock split announcement standardized by book value of total assets a year prior to the
announcement. Long-term operating performance is defined as operating income before
depreciation two fiscal year-end immediately after the split announc ement minus operating
income before depreciation at the fiscal year-end prior to the stock split announcement
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standardized by book value of total assets. Abnormal values are calculated for each of these
variables by subtracting the value of the median firm in the industry from that of our sample. 13

AOPS =

O0 − O −1 MedO0 − MedO−1
−
TA -1
MedTA−1

AOPL=

O+ 2 − O−1 MedO+ 2 − MedO−1
−
TA -1
MedTA−1

Table IX shows the abnormal operating performance overall and by time period. On
panel A I find that during the first year immediately after the split announcement the mean
(median) abnormal operating performance of the splitting sample exceeds those of the median
firm by 1.063% (0.037%) during the 1986 through 2002 period. 14 The difference in mean and
median between the split sample and the industry are statistically significant, although the
difference is very small. The long-term operating performance of the splitting sample
significantly exceeds those of the median firm by 2.276%.
The next step is to look at abnormal operating performance of pre- and post- EPACT
periods. The results on panel B do not show a statistically significant increase in operating
performance between the overall industry and our splitting sample for the 1986-1992 period.
The mean (median) abnormal operating performance is 0.534% (-0.013%) for the short-term and
1.072% (0.276%) for the long-term. The abnormal operating performance is quite different for
the post- EPACT period, 1993-2002. During this period the mean (median) abnormal operating
performance of the splitting sample exceeds those of the median firm by 1.778% (0.237%) in the
short-term and by 4.403% (0.703%) in the long-term.

13
14

See details in section 4.2.
Similar results are reported for the contaminated sample.
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Based on the results presented in this section, I cannot reject the hypothesis that operating
performance increases after the 1992 period.

Table IX
Analysis of Operating Performance for Electric Utility Split Sample
The table shows the mean and median abnormal operating performance overall and by time
period. Short-term operating performance is defined as operating income before depreciation at
the fiscal year-end immediately after the split announcement minus operating income before
depreciation at the fiscal year-end prior to the stock split announcement standardized by book
value of total assets a year prior to the announcement.
Long-term operating performance is
defined as operating income before depreciation two fiscal year-end immediately after the split
announcement minus operating income before depreciation at the fiscal year-end prior to the stock
split announcement standardized by book value of total assets a year prior to the announcement.
Abnormal values are calculated for each of these variables by subtracting the value of the median
firm in the industry from that of our sample.
AOPS =

O0 − O−1 MedO 0 − MedO −1
−
TA -1
MedTA−1

AOPL = O +2 − O−1 − MedO+2 − MedO−1
TA-1

MedTA−1

O: operating income before depreciation
TA:standardized variable, total assets measure
Med:median firm in the industry
Subscripts -1: fiscal year-end prior to the announcement
Subscripts 0: fiscal year-end immediately after the announcement
Subscripts +2: two fiscal year-end after the announcement
The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z test statistical differences in mean and median between the split
sample and the industry. ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Entire Period
Abnormal Operating Performance
Short-Term

Long-Term

94

83

Mean

1.063

2.276

Median

0.037

0.397

3.294***

2.448**

1.196

2.210**

N

t-Statistic
Wilcoxon-Z
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Table IX (continued)
Panel B: Time Period
Abnormal Operating Performance
Short-Term

Long-Term

54

53

Mean

0.534

1.072

Median

0.013

0.276

t-Statistic

1.552

2.033**

Wilcoxon-Z

0.786

0.853

40

30

Mean

1.778

4.403

Median

0.237

0.703

3.031***

1.855*

1.301*

2.035**

1986 - 1992
N

1993 - 2002
N

t-Statistic
Wilcoxon-Z

Hence, operating performance of the splitting sample provides evidence of signaling of
managerial ability at least after the post- EPACT period when information asymmetry levels are
higher.

6.3.2. Tests of the liquidity-marketability hypothesis
The empirical evidence of whether a stock split improves liquidity and/or marketability
varies and depends on the liquidity/marketability measure used. When liquidity is measured by
trading volume and percentage bid-ask spreads, several studies find a reduction in liquidity after
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stock splits. Nevertheless, when liquidity is viewed in terms of increasing the number of
shareholders and widening the ownership base, the evidence supports the notion that stock splits
result in an increase of liquidity. Copeland (1979) finds a decrease in trading volume following
a split. However, Lakonishok and Lev (1987) show that it is the trading volume prior to the split
which is abnormally high, and that it returns to normal within two months of the split. The
marketability hypothesis posits that by splitting stocks and reducing share price, firms increase
the attractiveness of their shares to individual shareholders. As a possible motivation of stock
split, previous literature shows an increase in the number of individual shareholders. Lamoureux
and Poon (1987) developed a tax-option hypothesis in which stock splits result in clientele shifts
from institutional to individual shareholders.
This section tests the marketability and liquidity hypotheses by looking first at the
changes in prices before and after the split. Then, changes in number of shareholders and
changes in trading volume are accessed.

A) Pre- and post-split prices
There have been extensive empirical studies documenting an association between stock
splits and pre-split prices run-ups. Fama et al. (1969) find that shares of splitting firms earned
abnormal returns for 29 months prior to the split, and Lakonishok and Lev (1987) report that
shares rise by about 70 percent more than those of their control sample over the four years
preceding the split announcement. Rozeff (1998) tests the distribution of prices of 145 mutual
funds that split with the distribution of prices of the price-control sample of non-splitting mutual
funds. He concludes that pre-split prices of mutual funds are significantly higher than the prices
of other non-splitting funds.
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The trading range hypothesis suggests that splits realign per-share prices to a preferred
price range (McNichols and Dravid, 1990). This realignment of share prices is triggered by a
pre-split price runup. Ikenberry et al. (1996) find in their sample that less than 3 percent of
splitting firms have pre-split prices below the median price observed for firms of similar size.
They suggest that splits are most often observed when prices have increased substantially in the
recent past or shares are trading at a high level. The trading range hypothesis and liquidity
hypothesis are not mutually exclusive explanations. Individuals may have a preference for a
specific trading range because liquidity is higher at that price range. Therefore, I test the
hypothesis that pre-split utility stock prices are significantly higher than the prices of other nonsplitting utility stocks. Stock splits realign per-share prices to a preferred price range. This
preferred price range is mainly justified on the basis that it improves marketability and liquidity.
I test this implication by comparing the pre-split share price, defined as the closing price
ten days before the split announcement, of public utility firms with those of the median control
sample. The control sample is created by taken all companies in the 4900’s SIC codes that have
not announced a split during the period 1986 through 2002. Table X shows the results. I find
that the mean (median) price ten days before the split announcement is $40.84 ($39.56) for the
split sample, and $18.65 ($17.63) for the control group. Clearly, the splitting sample shows a
run- up in prices well above that of the control group. The Wilcoxon test for the difference in
medians between the splitting and control sample prices produces a statistic of 21.08, which is
highly significant. After the split, the results show that the mean (median) price of the electric
utility split sample is $22.80 ($21.90), which is much closer to those prices observed within the
control group. Based on these results I do not reject the hypothesis that pre-split prices are
significantly higher than those of the control group.
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Table X
Electric Utility Prices, 1986-2002
The first row shows mean, fractiles, and standard deviation of prices 10 days before the
announcement date of 108 electric utility stock splits between 1986 – 2002. A control group is
created by taken all companies in the 4900’s SIC codes that have not announced a split during the
period of 1986 – 2002 on CRSP. For each of these companies prices are taken 10 days before the
announcement of the 108 utility stock split sample. The control group row shows the mean,
fractiles and standard deviation of the distribution of prices. The sample post-split row shows the
mean, fractiles, and standard deviation of prices after the 108 electric utility stock split. Post-split
prices are obtained after dividing the pre-split price by the ratio of number of shares exchanged
for the number of old share.

Sample of
Electric Utilities
pre-split

Control Group
Sample of
Electric Utilities
Post-split

N

Mean

10%

50%

90%

Std. Dev

108

40.84

24.97

39.56

55.55

14.68

23,467

18.65

7.82

17.63

30.60

9.45

108

22.80

15.00

21.90

30.66

6.95

Table XI looks at the different in prices between the splitting and control sample for the
pre- and post-EPACT periods. Both sub-samples show a run- up in prices before the split. The
mean (median) price ten days before the split announcement is $38.74 ($39.56) for the split
sample, and $14.29 ($13.63) for the control group during the 1986-1992 period. After the split,
the mean (median) price of the splitting sample is $21.80 (21.22) which is much closer to those
prices observed within the control group. Similar results are observed for the post-EPACT
period.
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Table XI
Electric Utility Prices by Time Period
This table shows mean, fractiles, and standard deviation of prices 10 days before the
announcement date of electric utility stock splits between the two sub-periods 1986–1992, and
1993-2002. The control groups are created by taken all companies in the 4900’s SIC codes that
have not announced a split during the two sub-periods on CRSP. For each of these companies
prices are taken 10 days before the announcement of the utility stock split sample. The control
group row shows the mean, fractiles and standard deviation of the distribution of prices. The
sample post-split row shows the mean, fractiles, and standard deviation of prices after the electric
utility stock split. Post-split prices are obtained after dividing the pre-split price by the ratio of
number of shares exchanged for the number of old share.

N

Mean

10%

50%

90%

Std. Dev

66

38.74

25.96

39.56

49.41

9.72

14,242

14.29

6.72

13.63

22.99

6.46

66

21.80

15.00

21.22

28.89

5.25

42

44.15

23.44

39.87

83.50

19.86

9,225

23.48

13.04

22.63

35.38

9.88

42

24.39

15.06

22.98

41.75

8.83

1986 – 1992
Sample of Electric
Utilities Pre -split

Control Group
Sample of Electric
Utilities Post-split

1993 – 2002
Sample of Electric
Utilities Pre -split

Control Group
Sample of Electric
Utilities Post-split

Figure I and II show histograms of pre- and post- split prices after electric utility splits
during 1986 – 1992. Results show that almost 90% of the sample firms that split their stock have
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share prices above the 80th percentile before the split. Only 3% of the sample firms have prices
at or below the median price of firms within the same industry. In conclusion, Figure I and II
show that splits realign share prices from a high level to a range that is closer to that of the
median firm in the same industry.

Figure I
Histogram of Prices before Utility Stock Splits, 1986-1992
12

Frequency

10

Mean = 38.74053
Std. Dev. = 9.7215144
N = 66

8

6

4

2

0
10

20

30

40

Stock Price

58

50

60

70

Figure II
Histogram of Prices after Utility Stock Splits, 1986-1992
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Figures III and IV show the same histogram of price percentiles before and after utility
stock splits during the post-EPACT period of 1993-2002. The graphs show that approximately
more than 95% of the sample of firms have prices exceeding the 80th percentile during 19932002 period. After the split, the median price falls at the 20th percentile for the pre-EPACT
period and lower than the 20th percentile for the post-EPACT period. The results show that splits
realign share prices from a high level to a range closer to that of the median firm in the same
industry; however, this realignment seems more pronounced for the pre-EPACT period when
levels of information asymmetry are lower.
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Figure III
Histogram of Prices before Utility Stock Splits, 1993-2002
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Figure IV
Histogram of Prices after Utility Stock Splits, 1993-2002
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B) Changes in the number of shareholders
To directly identify the liquidity effects of public utility stock splits, I now turn to the
analysis of the shareholder base. The underline assumption is that if there are benefits to
returning the stock price to a lower trading range, I should observe evidence of liquidity
improvement after the split. This liquidity improvement can be observed using different
variables. Specifically, by lowering the share price to a more popular range, liquidity increases
because more persons are buying or selling the stock.

A lower share price enables a greater

number of investors to trade economically in round lots and thereby encourages wider stock
ownership. A survey of managers’ motives for stock splits by Baker and Gallagher (1980)
revealed that 98.4 percent of the respondents indicated that splits make it easier for small
investors to purchase round lots, and 93.7 percent believed that splits keep a firm’s stock price in
an optimal range and increases the number of share holders.
Broadening outside ownership may be value-enhancing if it improves common stock
liquidity or if it insulates managers from the corporate control market. If managers are
concerned with a takeover threat, they rather have a broad and heterogeneous stockholder base
since individual investors are less likely to tender shares to a bidder. Individual investors may
not even be aware of takeover bids hence will not respond to them quickly. In most industries,
managers are very concerned with an actual takeover. Hence, they may view stock splits as a
tool to help fight the threats of takeovers. However, within the electric and gas utility industry
takeover activity has historically been quite limited. In the period from 1960 to 1996 for
example, there were only nine hostile takeover attempts and none were successful (McLaughlin
and Mehran (1995)). In the five years from 1986 to 1990 there were 13 takeover attempts and
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only one was successful. Most of these takeover attempts failed primarily because of the federal
regulatory procedures based on the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935.
Therefore, within the public electric utility industry, the main motivation for having a
broader shareholder base should be an increase in common stock liquidity rather than to insulate
managers from the corporate control market. I test the hypothesis that there is an increase in the
number of shareholders after the split due to liquidity and marketability reasons.
Table XII reports the percentage changes in the number of shareholders overall and by
time period for the clean sample of utility stock splits. The percentage change in the number of
shareholders is measured between the fiscal year-end immediately following the split ex-date and
the fiscal year-end preceding the ex-date. The ex-date is taken from CRSP and the number of
shareholders is taken form Compustat. There is a significant average increase in the in the
number of shareholders of 3.25% during 1986– 2002 period. The median result is very small,
0.02%, and insignificant.
I also look at the percentage change in the number of shareholders pre- and postderegulation periods. For the pre-EPACT period the mean (median) increase in the number of
shareholders is 4.25% (0.47%), and significant. The results are quite different for the second
period, 1993 – 2002, after the enactment of EPACT.

I did not find a significant average

increase in the number of shareholders for those splits during the 1993 – 2002 period. Moreover,
the median results show a decrease of -1.80 % during those years.
Based on the results presented on this section, I do not reject the hypothesis that there is
an increase in the number of shareholders after the split during the entire period from 1986 –
2002 due to liquidity reasons. However, when the sample is broken down into pre- and postEPACT periods, 1986-1992 and 1993-2002, respectively, I only find a statistically significant
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increase in the number of shareholders during the first period, 1986-1992. These results are
consistent with the idea that liquidity motives of stock splits are more likely to appear before the
deregula tion period when levels of information asymmetry are the lowest.

Table XII
Percentage Changes in the Number of Shareholders
This table shows the mean and (median) percentage change in the number of shareholders for the
clean sample overall and by time periods. The change in the number of shareholders is measured
between the fiscal year-end preceding the split announcement date and the fiscal year-end
immediately following the split announcement date. The t-statistic and Wilcoxon-Z test statistical
differences in mean and median
between pre and post-split period. ***, **, * denote
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.

Variable

N

Mean
(Median )
%

t-stat.
Wilcoxon-Z

% change in the number of
shareholders

90

3.250

2.1981**

(0.020)

-0.245

4.246

2.599**

(0.473)

-1.758*

1.830

0.667

(-1.800)

-1.634

in the year containing the split

Time Period
1986-1992

1993-2002

53

37

C) Changes in trading patterns
To identify the market effect of public utilities stock splits, I now turn to the analysis of
trading activities. Most empirical studies of the liquidity effects of stock splits use trading
volume. Copeland (1979) provides evidence suggesting a decrease in the volume of trade
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subsequent to a stock split and interprets these findings as a decrease in the marketability of
stock splits. Lamoureux and Poon (1987) find that dollar trading volume declines after OTC,
NYSE, and AMEX stock splits. However, Lakonishok and Lev (1987) note that volume is
abnormally high prior to splits. Moreover, Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) examine various
characteristics of trading patterns around ADR splits and find that splits appear to increase the
frequency and volume of small trades. They conclude that overall liquidity measures improve
after the split for the category of small trades.
Trading volume has been measured in a variety of ways, including the number of shares
traded, dollar volume of shares traded, and the number of transactions. In addition, the literature
has also used a liquidity statistic based on the number of shares traded per unit of return as well
as a turnover rate, measured as the number of shares traded divided by the number of shares
outstanding. Each of these measures is supported under different basis. For instance, Datar et al.
(1998) use the turnover rate since they believe that the number of shares traded by itself is not a
sufficient measure for the liquidity of a stock since it does not take into account the differences
in the number of shares outstanding or the shareholder base. Barclay and Warner (1993) also
suggest that volume alone is not sufficient as a gauge of activity since informed traders will hide
large trades by splitting them up.
In this section, I test that hypothesis that trading volume increases after the split. I follow
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1996) and collect all trades for 120 trading days before and after the
utility stock split ex-date. I collect from CRSP all electric and gas utility companies that have
reported a stock split ex-distribution date. The ex-distribution date is defined as the date on
which the security is first traded after the split of the stock. I find 180 stock splits with available
ex-distribution dates. There are 21 observations for which declaration date was not reported on
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CRSP for these splits. For the 180 splits I calculate the daily dollar volume for the 120 days
before and after the split. CRSP reports the total number of shares of a particular stock sold on a
day, which I them multiply by the closing price of that stock on the same day to calculate the
daily dollar volume. Then, I compute the average of the daily dollar volume for the 120 days
before the split ex-date. The same procedure is followed to calculate the average daily dollar
volume of the 120 days after the ex-date.

15

Table XIII, panel A, shows the mean and median daily dollar volume for the pre- and
post-split period for the overall sample of 180 stock splits during 1986 – 2002 period. On
average there is a significant increase in daily dollar volume from $5.2 million before the split to
$6.1 million after the split. Median values are not significant. Based on mean results, I do not
reject the hypothesis that trading volume increases after the split.
On panel B, I follow the same procedure of the previous section and I break down the
sample in two periods, before and after the enactment of EPACT. I study the changes in trading
patters for the two sub-periods separately to see if there is a significant difference between them.
During the first period, 1986-1992, there is a small and insignificant change between the pre-and
post-split daily dollar volume. Median results show a drop in dollar value of shares trades. On
the other hand, the second period, 1993-2002 shows a significant average increase of $1.9
million in the dollar value of shares traded between pre- and post-split periods.
Overall, I conclude from table XIII that utility stock splits, during the period of 19862002, on average increase the volume of trade. However, when the sample is broken into two
sub-periods, the results are not the same for the pre- and post-deregulation periods. The 19861993 period experiences a drop in dollar value of shares traded. Nevertheless, this decrease in
15

I also study the changes in trading patterns for the subset of 159 stock splits for which announcement dates are
available and the results are basically the same. Therefore, I only present results for the entire sample of 180 stock
splits.
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dollar value can be explained by an increase in the number of small transactions per day since
the number of shareholders increases significantly following the split, as shown in the previous
section. On the other hand, the second period, 1993-2002, experiences a significant increase in
the average dollar value of trade, consistent with the liquidity hypothesis.

Table XIII
Changes in Trading Patterns Around Utility Splits
This table shows the mean and median change in daily dollar volume 120 days before and 120
days after the split ex-date. The data to calculate the daily dollar volume is taken from CRSP.
Panel A shows the results for the overall period that includes 180 public utility stock splits during
1986- 2002 period. Panel B shows the results for the two sub-periods. The t-statistic and
Wilcoxon-Z test statistical differences in mean and median between pre and post-split period. *
denote significance at 10 percent level.
Panel A: Overall Period (N=180)
Mean

Daily Dollar Volume
Median

Pre-split

$5,188,794

$802,315

Post-split

$6,088,658

$786,719

$899,864

-$9,722

1.661*

-0.604

Pre-split

$1,652,432

$537,897

Post-split

$1,689,297

$515,679

$36,865

-$15,649

0.493

-0.969

Pre-split

$9,415,178

$1,575,232

Post-split

$11,346,431

$1,570,651

Change

$1,931,253

-$3,822

1.637*

-0.086

Change
t-Statistic/Wilcoxon-Z

Panel B: Time Period
1986-1992 (N=98)

Change
t-Statistic/Wilcoxon-Z
1993-2002 (N=82)

t-Statistic/Wilcoxon-Z
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6.4. Multivariate analysis and robustness check
The following section presents the results of the multivariate analysis as well as the
robustness check. To test the signaling and liquidity/marketability hypotheses, a regression
approach is used to investigate the effects of different variables (mention below) on
announcement return.

6.4.1. Multivariate analysis
In this section I conduct cross-sectional ordinary least square regressions to determine
whether the abnormal returns, found in Table VI, are significantly related to signaling or
liquidity/marketability variables. The dependent variable is the three-day announcement period
return. The independent variables include firm asset value, the split factor, change in operating
performance, price run- up, and percentage change in the number of shareholders. I use total
assets instead of market value since Lakonishok and Lev (1987) observe that total assets is a
more reliable measure of size since market value generally increases substantially in the period
before a split announcement. Thus, Brown et al. (1983) observe a strong correlation between
market value of equity and total assets. They conclude that results are not likely to be sensitive
to the size variable used.
Table XIV shows the results of the multivariate analysis. Panel A shows the regression
analysis for the entire period, 1986 – 2002. Paralleling past empirical findings (Grinblatt et al.,
1984, Ikenberry et al., 1996), the coefficient on LNAT is negative and significant. Interpreting
that splits of smaller, less- followed firms have greater impact on announcement returns. The
coefficient for the split factor is positive but insignificant. This finding contradicts the hypothesis
that investors view firms with greater split factors as having more favorable private information.
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The change in operating performance does not seem to influence the announcement return of
utility stock splits. The coefficient is -0.028 and insignificant. The coefficient of RUNUP is not
significant. This suggests that the price variation previous to the split does not act as a forecast
of the forthcoming stock split. Finally, the change in the number of shareholders is positive and
significant as predicted. Apparently, firm size and the change in the number of shareholders are
the only variables that may explain announcement returns during the period of 1986-2002.

Table XIV
Regression Results
This table presents multivariate regression results overall and by time periods. The dependent
variable is the three-day value weighted abnormal return from one day before through one day
after the announcement date. The independent variables include the split factor, the price
runup, total assets, the change in the number of shareholders, and the change in operating
performance. LNAT is the natural logarithm of the firm’s total assets the fiscal year-end
previous to the split announcement, Split is the split factor, ∆SHO is the percentage change in
the number of shareholders from the fiscal year-end previous to the split announcement to the
fiscal year-end immediately after the split, and ∆OPER is the change in operating performance
from the fiscal year-end previous to the split announcement to the fiscal year-end immediately
after the split. The variable runup measures the stock price increase from day -120 to day -6.
***,**, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Panel A: Overall Period (1986-2002)
Predicted
Sign

Intercept

Coefficient

t-Stat.

0.045

2.850***

LNAT

-

-0.006

-2.906***

Split

+

0.009

0.843

∆OPER

+

-0.028

-0.275

RUNUP

-

0.000

-0.681

∆SHOL

+

0.002

1.962*

Adjusted R-Square

0.094

Number of Observations

92
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Table XIV (continued)
Panel B: Time Period
Predicted
Sign

Coefficient

t-Stat.

0.046

2.633**

1986 - 1992

Intercept
LNAT

-

0.000

-0.207

Split

+

-0.048

-1.086

∆OPER

+

0.026

0.254

RUNUP

-

0.000

0.085

∆SHOL

+

0.007

4.539***

Adjusted R-Square

0.105

Number of Observations

52

1993-2002

Intercept

0.011

0.498

LNAT

-

-0.004

-1.193

Split

+

0.032

2.457**

∆OPER

+

0.195

2.106*

RUNUP

-

0.001

0.247

∆SHOL

+

0.000

0.779

Adjusted R-Square

0.487

Number of Observations

39

Panel B shows the regression analysis for the two sub-periods, 1986 – 1992 and 1993 –
2002. For the first period, the coefficient of LNAT is negative and insignificant. Of particular
interest in this sub-sample is the coefficient of the change in the number of shareholders which is
positive and highly significant (t = 4.539). Since information asymmetry in this period is smaller
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than after the enactment of EPACT, motives other than signaling should predominate in the
decision of splitting stocks. Therefore, as shown on panel B liquidity/marketability variables,
specifically the increase in the number of shareholders, explains the abnormal announcement
return. On the other hand, during the second period, 1993-2002, the only two significant
variable is the split factor and the change in operating performa nce. During this period,
announcement abnormal returns are significantly impacted by the change in operating
performance (t = 2.3106) as expected. After the deregulation period, signaling variables should
be more prone to explain the abnormal announcement returns.
In summary, I find evidence which is consistent with both the signaling and liquidity
hypotheses. For the pre-EPACT period, liquidity explanations seem to predominate in
explaining the abnormal announcement return of utility stock splits. The post-EPACT period on
the other hand seems to have the signaling motive as a leading explanation of abnormal
announcement return.

6.4.2. Robustness check
In this section I consider whether the unusual earning increases following public utility
stock splits might be due to substantive changes in risk. Studies on long-run abnormal
performance are usually concern as to the robustness of the evidence. In theory, the risk
preceding and following the split ex-date should on the average be no different. Splits are
considered seemingly innocent events with no apparent potential to impact the firm’s risk or cash
flows. However, previous literature shows that stock splits also appear to be associated with
increases in both the total and systematic riskiness of stocks around ex-dates. Ohlson and
Penman (1985) study the stock return volatilities and find that they tend to increase dramatically
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following split ex-dates. Lamoreux and Poon (1987) find that stock volatilities usually decline
following reverse splits ex-dates. Brennan and Copeland (1988b) report a major increase in beta
coefficient on the ex-date but not on the announcement date. Wiggins (1992) finds that the
magnitude of this increase is sensitive to the return measurement interval. Thus, he exp lains the
Brennan and Copeland findings as the result of a more rapid response of security returns to
market information after the split date.
Table XV shows the results of the beta estimates preceding and following the split
announcement in two different ways. I follow Wiggins (1992) methodology to capture the
sample in which all stock splits in the sample are required to have complete daily return records
over days -80 through +84 relative to the ex-date on CRSP. The pre-split sample covers days -80
through -1 and the post-split sample includes days +5 through +84. The full sample includes 234
utility splits with ex-months between 1986 and 2002.
As shown in the results on panel A, I first estimate individual betas for the 234 splits
using the traditional ordinary least square (OLS) time-series method. Thus Rjt is defined as the
return on stock j on calendar date t, and Rmt is the CRSP value-weighted return on calendar date
t.

Rjt = a j + ßj Rmt + ujt

(6)

Separate pre- and post-split betas are calculated for each stock j and then average across
stocks. The results show a tendency for the average beta to increase after the ex-date. While the
average beta for the pre-split period is 0.366, it is 0.551 for the post-split period. The t-statistic
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for the difference between the average OLS beta for the pre- and post-split period is 4.526, which
is highly significant.

Table XV
Beta Estimates Preceding and Following Utility Stock Splits
This table shows estimates of market risk for the 80 days before and 80 days after 234 utility stock
splits ex-dates from 1986 – 2002. Panel A reports the time series beta using a one-factor model,
where the dependant variable is the return on stock j on calendar date t, and the market index is
the CRSP value-weighted returns. Panel B shows the results of the estimates using the crosssectional procedure of Ibbotson (1975). *** denote significance at 1 percent level.
Panel A: Time-Series Betas (Rjt = a j + ß j Rmt + u jt)
Beta Estimator
Pre-split
Post-split
(-80,-1)
(+5,+84)

Change
(Post-Pre)

Mean

0.366

0.551

0.150

Median

0.352

0.543

0.156

Sample Size

234

t-Statistic

5.264***

Panel B: Cross-Sectional Betas (Rjt = a t + ß t Rmt + u jt )

Mean

0.365

0.539

0.173

Median

0.359

0.530

0.175

Sample Size

80

t-Statistic

5.771***

On panel B I present the results using a different methodology to find the beta estimates.
I also employ the cross-sectional procedure of Ibbotson (1975) where
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Rjt = a t + ßt Rmt + ujt

(7)

ßt is now the average beta of splitting stocks for period t in event time. These daily event-time
betas are then average over event dates in each of the pre- and post-split periods. The results
show that the average beta estimate over the 80 days following the split ex-date is about 47
percent higher than over the 80 days preceding the ex-date. The average beta increases from
0.365 to 0.539 with a difference that is highly significant (t=5.771). The median and mean
results are very similar. Thus, median results also show a significant increase in beta estimates
after the split ex-dates. Therefore, it is surprising to find an increase in systematic risk after the
split ex-date since a split would generally be thought of as conveying firm-specific risk rather
than economy-wide information.
Other literature in the area also finds an increase in systematic risk when beta coefficients
are calculated using daily data. 16 However, Wiggins (1992) shows evidence that the increase in
risk is largely confined to a short period immediately following the split announcement.
Dubofsky (1991) do not find significant evidence that risk is fundamentally changing. Previous
articles use daily data and in some cases weekly data which can be noisy and potentially prone to
error. Moreover, Ikenberry and Ramnath (2002) detect a short- lived increase in systematic risk
in the months surrounding the split. They conclude that the modest increase in beta has little
ability to explain the post-split drift.
Next, I calculate the beta estimates preceding and following the split announcement for
the pre- and post-EPACT periods. Table XVI shows the results using the traditional ordinary
least square (OLS) time-series method. The results show an average increase in beta from 0.433
to 0.630 for the pre-EPACT period. The post-EPACT period also shows an increase in the beta
16

See Brennan and Copeland (1988) and Wiggins (1992).
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estimates of about 47%. The average beta 80 days before the split for those firms with split exdates between 1993 and 2002 is 0.301. This beta increases to 0.443 after the split for the postEPACT period.

Table XVI
Beta Estimates Preceding and Following Utility Stock Splits, by Time Period
This table shows estimates of market risk for the 80 days before and 80 days after 234 utility stock
splits ex-dates. The dependent variable is the return on stock j on calendar date t and the market
index is the CRSP value-weighted returns. Panel A reports the time series beta using a one-factor
model for the pre-EPACT period. Panel B shows the beta estimates using a one-factor model for
the post-EPACT period. *** denote significance at 1 percent level.
Time Period: 1986-1992
Pre-split
(-80,-1)

Beta Estimator
Post-split
(+5,+84)

Change
(Post-Pre)

Mean

0.433

0.630

0.195

Median

0.431

0.628

0.199

Sample Size

150

t-Statistic

4.563***

Time Period: 1993-2002

Mean

0.301

0.443

0.140

Median

0.304

0.444

0.102

Sample Size

84

t-Statistic

4.235***
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CHAPTER 7
CONCLUSION

This dissertation examines managerial motivation for splitting stocks in the public
electric utility industry before and after the enactment of the Energy Policy Act of 1992. These
changes in the regulatory process opened a window of opportunities for the study and
comparison of the two leading explanations for stock splits found in the literature, namely
signaling and liquidity- marketability. The signaling hypothesis posits that firms split their shares
to reveal favorable information. The liquidity/marketability hypothesis states that stock splits
enhance the attractiveness of shares to investors and increase the volume of trade by restoring
prices to a preferred trading range. Hence, the liquidity and marketability motives should play a
more important role in the pre- EPACT era, while signaling motive should dominate in the postEPACT era due to the increase of information asymmetry.
During the pre-EPACT period (1986-1992) I find that the results are consistent with the
idea that liquidity motives of stock splits predominate given that the levels of information
asymmetry are the lowest. I test the liquidity- marketability hypothesis by looking first at the
changes in prices before and after the split. Then, changes in number of shareholders and
changes in trading volume are accessed. The trading range hypothesis suggests that splits realign
per-share prices to a preferred price range (McNichols and Dravid, 1990). This realignment of
share prices is triggered by a pre-split price runup. Ikenberry et al. (1996) find in their sample
that less than 3 percent of splitting firms have pre-split prices below the median price observed
for firms of similar size. The results show that splits realign share prices from a high level to a
range closer to that of the median firm in the same industry. Moreover, this realignment seems
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more pronounced for the pre-EPACT period when levels of information asymmetry are lower.
The changes in the number of shareholders show that there is an increase in the number of
shareholders after the split during the entire period from 1986 – 2002 due to liquidity reasons.
However, when the sample is broken down into pre- and post- EPACT periods, I only find a
statistically significant increase in the number of shareholders during the first period, 1986-1992.
Finally, the changes in trading volume before and after the split ex-date show that the preEPACT period experiences a drop in dollar value of shares traded. Nevertheless, this decrease in
dollar value can be explained by an increase in the number of sma ll transactions per day since
the number of shareholders increases significantly following the split.
During the post-EPACT era (1993-2002) I find evidence consistent with signaling
explanation for stock splits. I test the signaling hypothesis by examining the announcement
period return, the relation between split factors and abnormal returns, and the changes in
operating performance of the splitting firms. Finding significant abnormal excess stock returns,
a positive relation between split factors and abnormal return, and abnormal increase in earnings
around the split are consistent with signaling explanations. The results show that the market
reaction to the announcement of utility stock splits is significantly positive but lower than the
excess returns found for industrial stock splits during the 1986 through 2002 period. When the
sample is broken down into pre- EPACT period (1986-1992) and post- EPACT period (19932002), I find that the market reaction is greater for the pre-EPACT period. I interpret these
excess returns for 1986-1992 period as the market’s reflection of the expected benefits from
greater post-split liquidity and marketability. Furthermore, I test whether split factors can
explain the abnormal excess return observed after the announcement of public utility stock splits.
McNichols and Dravid (1990) and Conroy and Harris (1999) conclude that managers employ the

76

split factor to reveal information about future earnings improvements. The results show that
managers use the split factor to convey information about the firm’s future performance.
Specifically, split factors can explain the abnormal excess return observed after the
announcement of public utility stock splits for the post- EPACT period when levels of
information asymmetry are higher. Finally, the increase in operating performance of the splitting
sample provides evidence of signaling of managerial ability at least after the post- EPACT
period.
The cross-sectional regression also provides convincing evidence that utility stock split
motives change before and after the enactment of the EPACT. Before the EPACT liquidity and
marketability motives explain the positive stock price reaction to announcement of public utility
splits whereas after the EPACT signaling motives prevail. The three day announcement period
returns are positively related to the change in the number of shareholders for the pre-EPACT
period and positively related to the change in operating performance for the post-EPACT period.
In conclusion, I find evidence which is consistent with both the signaling and
liquidity/marketability hypotheses. For the pre- EPACT period, liquidity explanations seem to
predominate in explaining the abnormal announcement return of utility stock splits. The postEPACT period on the other hand seems to have the signaling motive as a leading explanation of
abnormal announcement return.
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APPENDIX
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THEORIES OF REGULATION

In this appendix, I describe the three regulatory theories presented in the literature,
namely the public interest or market failure theory, the political economy theory and the
imperfect monitoring theory.

A) The public interest or market failure theory
This theory of regulation is perhaps the one that is most frequently invoke. According
to this theory, regulation is introduced to enhance efficiency in those markets where competitive
system fails. The regulator works as an impartial referee in attempting to maximize social
welfare. Much of this theory’s attention is devoted to the regulatory price-setting process, and it
is implicit that the regulator need not concern himself with other aspects of utility operations.
This theory’s basic focus is on sources of market failure.

B) The political economy theory
This theory takes the position that market forces, working through the political system,
shape the formation of ongoing activities of the regulatory process itself (Peltzman (1976)).
Regulation is recognized as an instrument not so much for achieving economic efficiency as for
shifting wealth. Both, firms and consumers groups are seen as competing in the political market
place in an attempt to win favorable outcomes. For Peltzman (1976), regulation will tend to be
more heavily weighted toward producer protection in depressions and towards consumer
protection in expansions. This implies that regulation should reduce the systematic risk of
utilities’ operating cash flows.
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C) The imperfect monitoring theory
This theory emphasizes the information asymmetry between parties to the process, the
importance of procedural rules and the regulator’s pursuit of a quiet life (Owen and Braeutigan,
1978). As in the political economy theory, firms and consumers compete for economic benefits
through the regulatory process and, in a broad sense, these results in intended outcomes. Owen
and Braeutigan (1978) suggest that participants are ultimately seeking a level of fairness that
does not exist in unregulated markets, and this is accomplished through well-established
procedural rules upon which all parties can rely. Unlike the political economy theory, however,
the mechanical nature of such rules or differences in information on the part of one or more
groups creates opportunities for strategic behavior. In the short run, one group might be able to
capture benefits by means that its adversaries did not anticipate. In the long run, such
opportunities should tend to disappear, or at least change in nature since the different parties
learn from experience and procedural rules are updated.
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